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[T] he system of criminal justice must attract more peo-
ple and better people-police, prosecutors, judges, defense
attorneys, probation and parole officers, and corrections
officials with more knowledge, expertise, initiative and
integrity.'
The experience of the Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
ministration has demonstrated that the full and equal
participation of women and minority individuals in em-
ployment opportunities in the criminal justice system is
a necessary component to the Safe Streets Act's program
to reduce crime and delinquency in the United States.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Indiana's Criminal Justice System (ICJS) is in constant
need of quality people as employees within its various agencies.
The thesis of this Article is that the ICJS should select these
quality people from a pool of candidates who are "people" and
not just "white men." Women are seeking, and at times demand-
ing,3 employment within criminal justice systems. To some de-
*Assistant Professor of Business Law, Indiana University. B.A., De Pauw
University, 1969; J.D., Indiana University, 1972.
**Assistant Professor, Department of Forensic Studies, Indiana Uni-
versity. B.I.E., Auburn University, 1966; J.D., Indiana University, 1970.
'PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY vi (1967).
228 C.F.R. § 42.301(a) (1974).
3In August 1973 the United States Department of Justice filed a civil
suit against the Chicago Police Department to enforce equal employment op-
portunity regulations. Chicago employs approximately 13,500 police officers,
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gree they are being accommodated.' The Police Foundation has
backed a major study of policewomen on patrol,' and women are
entering law schools and the legal profession in significantly in-
creasing numbers.' However, rarely do women reach executive,
professional, or managerial positions within the ICJS. In con-
trast, more and more women are moving into similar positions in
business and industry.'
The basic question addressed by this Article is: Do statutory
employment requirements, express or implied, discourage or pre-
clude applications by women for or promotion of women to execu-
tive, professional, or managerial positions within the Indiana
Criminal Justice System? The answer given is necessarily of
limited scope. At this initial stage, only one category of factors
affecting the entire Indiana Criminal Justice System is consid-
ered-Indiana's statutes and their implications as well as issues
raised in sex discrimination cases. An examination of informal
agency policies and other organizational considerations is left to
a later study.
Although this Article is confined to the Indiana Criminal
Justice System, that system is not unique and the problems dis-
cussed have implications for other criminal justice systems. Within
the ICJS are included the state, county, city, and town agents and
agencies designated to detect criminal offenses, to apprehend crim-
inal offenders, to prosecute, defend, and adjudicate accused per-
sons, and to "correct" those who are convicted of committing
crimes. While this is designated as a singular system, it is recog-
nized that the ICJS is more accurately viewed as a collagenous
assembly of town marshals, supreme court justices, state troopers,
city judges, attorneys general, and private defense attorneys. As
of which 115 (0.85 percent) are women. See LEAA Newsletter, November
,1973, at 24.
4Some agencies are actively seeking women for entry level criminal
justice positions. See Pogrebin, The Working Woman, LADIES HOME JOURNAL,
September 1973, at 36.
5 P. BLOCH & D. ANDERSON, POLICEWOMAN ON PATROL (1974).
'The 1973 enrollment of women in law school is nine times the 1963
enrollment, 1,883 to 16,760. Women now comprise 15.6% of the total en-
rollment in approved law schools. Ruud, That Burgeoning Law School En-
rollment is Portia, 60 A.B.A.J. 182 (1974).
7Reference to the Appendix will indicate the very few women in the
ICJS. See also Ellett, Monroe Has Only Female Deputy Prosecutor in State,
Bloomington-Bedford Sunday Herald-Times, Dec. 9, 1973, at 2, col. 1; Scutt,
Woman Wields Gavel in Superior Court, Bloomington-Bedford Sunday Herald-
Times, Nov. 26, 1972, at 22, col. 3.
'See generally Orth & Jacobs, Women in Management: Pattern for
Change, 49 HARv. Bus. REv. 139 (July-Aug. 1971).
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incongruous as such a collage may be, this "system" does have a
singular concern-crime and society's public response to it.
To further narrow its scope to a manageable dimension, this
Article focuses upon those federal and state laws affecting the
ICJS positions of concern. Some of these laws explicitly exclude
certain classes of persons; others impliedly include certain classes
of persons; others are a combination of these approaches. In any
event, this Article is concerned with the legal environment of these
ICJS positions. Its conclusions are directed toward changes in the
law or changes in practice to more closely comply with present
laws. Moreover, the ICJS positions of interest here are profes-
sional, managerial, and executive positions. Generally, the au-
thors have defined these positions as those requiring advanced
training and education, involving mental rather than manual work,
requiring primarily the control or direction of others, or involv-
ing the administration of a collection of several functions.'
Specifically, this study includes such Indiana law enforce-
ment officials as town marshals, chiefs of police, sheriffs, the
state police superintendent, and middle-management positions
within larger law enforcement agencies. Also included are county
prosecutors and their deputy prosecutors as well as the Indiana
Attorney General and those members of his (no woman has ever
held the post) staff who deal with criminal prosecutions. Public
defenders and private attorneys who handle a significant number
of criminal cases are covered as are judges with criminal juris-
diction, such as town, city, and county judges, judges of the court
of appeals, and supreme court justices. In the corrections field
the study encompasses state institution heads, state division heads
and other middle-management positions, local jail supervisors,
county probation officers with adult criminal probationers, and
state parole officers with adult criminal parolees.
Those ICJS positions not mentioned above are excluded from
this study but cannot be ignored. For example, if police chiefs
are chosen from the law enforcement agency's lower ranks and
agency entrance is possible only at the patrol officer level, then
there will be no women police chiefs if there have been no women
patrol officers. The study also excludes consideration of such posi-
tions as bailiffs, justices of the peace, and prison guards. The
various juvenile justice positions are also not covered unless they
incorporate criminal justice responsibilities as well.
The next section discusses the general phenomenon of women
and employment in 1974. Following is an examination in detail
of the specific statutory requirements for employment within the
9 WEBSTER's NEw TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1437, 1095, 639 (2d ed. unabridged 1967).
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ICJS. The fourth section examines the discriminatory effect of
these specific statutory requirements. The Article closes with a
description of the authors' recommended ICJS affirmative ac-
tion plan.
II. WOMEN AND EMPLOYMENT
Criminal justice systems, including the ICJS, are not very
different from other institutions in terms of employment policies
and practices pertaining to professionals, executives, and man-
agers. Many of the same limitations, restraints, and roadblocks
which have prevented women from being employed in or pro-
moted to such positions in' other institutions are found in the
ICJS. Therefore, before turning to the ICJS material this sec-
tion explores some general notions about women and employment.
First, it examines the dimensions of women in employment, gen-
erally, and in professional positions. Secondly, it introduces the
legal environment surrounding women in employment.
The problems of equal rights and employment opportunities
for women are pervasive. In 1973, there were over 34.8 million
women in the work force, comprising 38.5% of the total labor
pool.'" Of these women, 18.5 million, representing 59%, were
married and living with their husbands. There is a concentration
of women in low-paying, dead-end jobs. As a result, the average
woman worker earns about three-fifths of what a man earns,"
and a fully employed woman high school graduate receives less
income on the average than a fully employed man with less than
eight years of schooling.
These figures must be understood in the context of the rea-
sons why women work. Most women work because of economic
need; two-thirds of all women workers are single, divorced, wid-
owed, or separated, or have husbands who earn less than $7,000
a year."2 About one out of nine families is headed by a woman,
and among poor families, almost two out of five. Approximately
three out of ten black families are headed by a woman; the ratio
in poor black families is almost three out of five. Other women
'"Statistics mentioned in this section are from the Women's Bureau,
Department of Labor.
'In 1971 the median incomes for full-time, year-round work were: white
men, $9,373; minority men, $6,598; white women, $5,490; and minority women,
$4,674.
'
2The working wife's income frequently raises the family above the
poverty level. In 1970 classified as poor were those non-farm families of four
with total income of less than $4,000. In husband-wife families, fourteen
percent are poor if the wife does not work; four percent are poor if the wife
does work.
[Vol. 8:297
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work because of other, non-monetary needs, that is, for the same
reasons many men work-psychological fulfillment, ego-gratifi-
cation, and a desire to succeed. Moreover, not only are women
working in increasing numbers but they have also begun to break
out of traditionally female occupations.'"
Women are moving into "executive suites" in increasing num-
bers. For example, women are being promoted to supervisory and
managerial positions by manufacturing companies. Banks are
moving women from teller positions to branch managers. Insur-
ance companies have encouraged women to assume positions in
sales." And there has been a small increase in the number of
women with graduate degrees during the past decade.' 5 How-
ever, the percentage of women in particular fields has declined
since the 1920's. Today women constitute about one percent of
all engineers, 3.5 percent of all lawyers, seven percent of all phy-
sicians, eight percent of all scientists, and nine percent of all full
professors in the field of academics.'"
Generally there exists a scarcity of information about women
in the professions. What is available often is outdated and does
not take into account the effects of recent legislative changes or
of the revitalized women's movement. The first congressional
committee hearings concerning discrimination on the basis of sex,
however, provided an opportunity to gather descriptive informa-
tion and to make public the breadth, depth, and pervasiveness of
sex discrimination in education, the labor market, the professions,
government, and even in the law itself. 7 By describing the status
'
3Steinem, If We're So Smart, Why Aren't We Rich, 1 Ms. 37, 127 (June
1973).
"Bralove, Where the Boys Are, Wall Street Journal, Apr. 18, 1974, at
1, col. 6.
'
5 The number of women graduate and doctoral business students has
increased from 3.1% to 5.5% of all such students in five years. Bralove,
supra note 14. Law school enrollment of women in 1973 was nearly nine
times the enrollment of women in 1963. Ruud, supra note 6. There has also
been a similar increase in the number of women lawyers but as a percentage
of all lawyers their number has only barely increased. DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN, CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS ON EQUAL RIGHTS IN EDUCA-
TION AND EMPLOYMENT 502 (C. Stimpson ed. 1973) (statement of attorney
Margaret Laurance) [hereinafter cited as STIMPSON].
' STIMPSON, supra note 15, at 4 (comment by subcommittee chairperson
Edith Green).
17 Id. at ix, x (foreword by Edith Green). The special subcommittee
hearings were based on a consideration of H.R. 16,098, 91st Cong. 2d Sess.
§805 (1970), directed at discrimination against women. The bill provided
for four changes in equal opportunity laws:
(1) amendment of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d, to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex
in federally assisted programs;
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of women in various professions we may better understand the
professional women in the criminal justice system and incidentally
dispel the "popular wisdom" that women are already powerful
and "more equal."
Information available in 1970 showed that women constituted
more than forty percent of all white collar workers. However,
only one out of ten working women was in a management posi-
tion and only one out of seven professional jobs was filled by a
woman. The resulting gap in earnings was such that in 1968 only
three percent of the women workers had incomes of at least
$10,000, whereas among men twenty-eight percent earned at least
that much. 8 Or to describe the situation in another way, ninety-
four percent of all jobs which pay at least $15,000 a year are
held by white men; women and minority men hold the remaining
six percent.'9
One professional area studied was business. Given business'
overall concern for productivity and profits one might anticipate
that it would be far easier for a woman to be successful there if
she were good. However, a recent survey of twenty top organiza-
tions"° showed that not only do women face substantial barriers
in their rise to the top, but the need to constantly caution firms
to hire only "qualified" women belied the firms' commitment to
individual worth. One never sees the caution "hire only qualified
men." Of course, one would expect a firm to hire and promote
on the basis of ability and qualifications; to assume it would not
do so in regard to women employees or applicants is only one
illustration of the fact that women are considered in a different
way, in a different light, from men.
The survey of twenty prominent employers included ten in-
dustrial companies from among the top one hundred companies
on the Fortune "500" list. Five of the ten surveyed were among
the top twenty. The other ten organizations, such as diversified
financial institutions and retailers, were on the Fortune "50
(2) removal of the educational institution exemption from Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e;
(3) removal of the exception of executive, administrative, and pro-
fessional employees from the equal pay provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); and
(4) authorization of the Civil Rights Commission to study discrim-
ination against women.
Although this particular House bill was defeated in 1970, by 1972 the
aims of section 805 had been realized. See text accompanying note 46 infra.
18STIMPSON, supra note 15, at 502-03 (statement of Margaret Laurance).
'
9Steinem, supra note 13, at 126.
2
"Fretz & Hayman, Progress for Women-Men Are Still More Equal,
51 HARv. Bus. Rzv. 133, 134 (Sept.-Oct. 1973).
[Vol. 8:297
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largest" list. In these twenty corporations, which employed ap-
proximately two million people, women represented thirty-six per-
cent of the total work force. On the other hand, women officials,
managers, and professionals accounted for less than one percent.2 '
Not only were attitudes of employers reflected in this study but
also mirrored was the fact that men are still considered better
risks for managerial training positions." Further, "equal pay for
equal work," although always a stated policy, was rarely a prac-
tice." The study concluded from all the available data that women
professionals perform on an equal level with men professionals.
However, it showed that bias against women still exists. For
example, women were not judged as seriously as men, or the judg-
ment of a woman's performance was affected by the negative atti-
tudes of her colleagues. The authors listed three sources of nega-
tive reactions: other supervised women, men who feel threatened
by a woman's advancement, and minority group employees who
may fear being slighted or ignored because of the company's con-
cern about women.2 4 Because of the stereotyped attitudes of their
colleagues, many women in management must tread carefully. On
the one hand, a woman cannot show emotion for fear of being
labeled tempermental and must remain low-keyed to halt subordi-
nates' ideas that she is "shrill." On the other hand, if a woman
manager is timid, hesitant or nervous, she has confirmed the
female stereotype.2 Employment under these contradictions and
traps is a strain; most men are allowed a wider range of accept-
able emotions and more personality variations are successfully
tolerated.
Another profession studied was science and engineering. The
National Research Council recently completed a survey of the na-
tion's doctorate-level scientists and engineers,"' detailing unem-
ployment levels, salaries, and types of employment positions. For
the 244,900 doctoral scientists and engineers, in 1973 the unem-
ployment rate was 1.2 percent. Women, who constituted nine per-
cent of the doctoral population, reported an unemployment of 3.9
percent while that of men was only 0.9 percent. The 1973 median
annual salary was $20,890; the highest median salary, $22,490,
was in engineering, the area with the lowest percentage of women.





25Bralove, supra note 14.26The survey was sponsored by the National Academy of Sciences in
1973. A complete copy of the report is on file at the Office of Research and
Advanced Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.
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the men. Of the various employment positions, approximately
sixty percent of the working population studied were employed
by educational institutions; more than twenty percent held posi-
tions in business and industry. Over forty percent of those work-
ing were engaged in research and development and its adminis-
tration; an additional thirty-eight percent were in teaching.
Seventy-five percent of the women were concentrated in the areas
of biosciences, psychology, and social sciences.
Because the woman doctoral scientist or engineer often fits
also into the category of women doctorates as academicians, one
should consider some of the attitudinal problems these women face
in the context of academics. For example, a 1969 study of the
woman doctorate by Helen Astin dealt in part with obstacles en-
countered in a professional woman's career development. In Astin's
sample of 1460 women doctorates, nine out of ten were working,
although over half were married and had families. 7 In fact, the
problem of adequate and dependable help, housekeeper or baby-
sitter, was considered the greatest obstacle encountered by these
women. Unexplained salary differentials, tenure, and promotion
policies, which included mandatory maternity leaves, and the usual
subtle types of discrimination which prove harder to assess"8 were
forms of perceived employer discrimination mentioned by the
women surveyed.
Interestingly, the percentage of degrees earned by women
has not continually grown since the turn of the century but in
fact peaked during the 1930's and 1940's. At the bachelor degree
level, women received nineteen percent of the degrees at the turn
of the century, forty percent in the early 1960's and forty-three
percent during the latter part of that decade. At the master's
degree level, women accounted for nineteen percent of the degrees
at the turn of the century, thirty-eight percent in 1940 and thirty-
two percent in the early 1960's. At the doctorate degree level,
women earned six percent in the early 1930's, thirteen percent in
1940 and eleven percent in the 1960's." In 1969-1970, there were
29,866 doctoral degrees granted; women accounted for 3,976, or
approximately thirteen percent.3"
Since graduate training is essential to an academic career, it
is apparent that women in higher education have been losing
27H. ASTIN, THE WOMAN DOCTORATE IN AMERICA (1969), reprinted in
STIMPSON, supra note 15, at 449.
81d. at 451.
"
9Rossi, Discrimination and Demography Restrict Opportunities for
Academic Women, 48 COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY BUSINESS 74 (Feb. 1970),
reprinted in STIMPSON, supra note 15, at 455.30U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, DIGEST OF
EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS 90 (1971).
[Vol. 8:297
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ground. In 1870, one-third of the faculty in the country's col-
leges and universities were women. Today women comprise only
about one-fourth of the total. At prestigious universities in the
"Big Ten," women hold ten percent or less of the faculty posi-
tions." For example, in 1973 at Indiana University, Bloomington,
only one out of thirty-five distinguished professors was a woman.
Thirty-three full professors, 38 associate professors, 64 assistant
professors and 6 instructors were women out of totals of 555,
405, 405, and 29 respectively,32 making up a total of 143 women
out of 1429 positions.
In defense of these statistics it is often alleged that there is
a lack of qualified women who hold doctorates in certain areas.
Defenders also point to the fact that a higher percentage of women
doctorates go into college or university teaching than do similarly
educated men." But, while women earn 24% of the English doc-
toral degrees awarded nationally, 28% of the English degrees
from the fifteen top schools, and 217o of the English degrees at
Indiana University, women faculty members comprise only 8.3%
of the total English faculty at Indiana University, Bloomington.
Similar proportions exist in other disciplines. Once hired, women
faculty are not immune from the unequal pay for equal work
problem. One author places a good deal of responsibility upon
typical departmental chairmen who have difficulty distinguishing
between women on their respective faculties and their own home-
maker wives. 5 Also contributing to the problem are department
chairmen who see nothing wrong with paying a woman less than
a man if she is married because she does not need as much, or if
she is not married, because she can get by on less.3
Another professional area examined was medicine. Estimates
by the Public Health Service indicate that by 1975 this country
will need over 100,000 more physicians than are presently active. 7
Since fewer than 8,000 physicians were graduated in June, 1967,
the problem in this profession is slightly different from the mar-
3 1STIMPSON, supra note 15, at 415 (statement of Dr. Bernice Sandier).
32Figures from the Office of Institutional Research, Indiana University,
Bloomington, Indiana. These totals exclude lecturers, visiting appointments,
and other "academic" appointments such as counselors or research associates.
In the fall of 1973 there were sixty-three tenured women faculty members.
3 3 STIMPSON, supra note 15, at 415 (statement of Dr. Bernice Sandler).
3 4Figures from the Office of the Dean for Women's Affairs, Indiana
University, Bloomington, Indiana.
35 Rossi, supra note 29, at 77, reprinted in STIMPSON, supra note 15, at 457.
3 6STIMPSON, supra note 15, at 417 (statement by Dr. Bernice Sandler).
3 7WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FACTS ON PROSPECTIVE
AND PRACTICING WOMEN IN MEDICINE (1968), reprinted in STIMPSON, supra
note 15, at 464. The following information is from that report.
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ket academics face. In 1965-1966 women accounted for nine per-
cent of the applicants and almost nine percent of the acceptances
in medical schools. In that same year, of the women who applied,
47.7% were accepted; the figure for men was 48.2%. The study
showed that women, who comprised 6.1% of the total active phy-
sicians, tended to prefer practice in hospitals, teaching, preven-
tive medicine, administration, or research rather than private
practice. In 1965, at least ten percent of all physicians engaged in
anesthesiology, pediatrics, physical medicine and rehabilitation,
preventive medicine, psychiatry, public health, and pulmonary
diseases were women.38
The results of a survey studying attitudes of members of the
medical profession toward women physicians demonstrated no
substantial difference from attitudes expressed by other profes-
sionals toward their female colleagues." Women were basically
suspect characters and carefully screened to ensure their commit-
ment to medicine. The survey also revealed a strong reluctance
to deal with or provide for pregnancy and childbearing situations.
Finally, consideration is given to the status of women in the
legal profession. 0 There were in 1970 over 8,000 women lawyers
in the United States. Although the federal government is deemed
the most nondiscriminatory employer of women, the percentage of
women attorneys holding federal positions declined from 7% in
1959 to 6.2% in 1969. Women tend to be hired at a lower grade
and remain there longer than men. In other positions, such as
judges and hearing examiners, the situation is worse." In law
firms the situation is no less questionable. For example, a survey
of forty major law firms in six different cities indicated there
were only 186 women out of 2,708 attorneys.42 Once employed by
a firm, a woman is likely to make much less money than her male
colleague and will more often engage in trusts and estates, do-
mestic relations, and tax work. Given these circumstances she is
also less likely to become a partner.4"
3 8When grouped in five categories women comprised the following per-
centages of total physicians in each category: general practice, 5.2%;
medical specialties, 8.6%; surgical specialties, 3.5%; psychiatry and neurology
11.5%; and other specialties, 7.4%. Id. at 474.
39H. KAPLAN, STUDYING ATTITUDES OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION TowARD
WOMEN PHYSICIANS: A SURVEY SPONSORED BY THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
MENTAL HEALTH (1969), reprinted in STIMPSON, supra note 15, at 482.
4 The material in this section is from a statement submitted to the
Special Subcommittee on Education by Margaret Laurance, reported in
STIMPSON, supra note 15, at 502.
4
1In 1970, only one percent of federal judges were women. Id.
42Id. at 505.
4 3An interesting and repeatedly quoted study is White, Women in the
Law, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1051 (1967).
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The attitudes of members of the legal profession toward
women are predictable as well as illustrative of attitudes held by
other professionals. Law firms are concerned that a woman will
marry and leave work, or if already married, will have children
and quit. Women do marry but rarely cease working for that
reason." Women also have children and do sometimes stop work-
ing on that account, although this withdrawal from work may be,
and in fact usually is, temporary. This career interruption is re-
lated to and affected by maternity leave provisions and problems
of child care which will be discussed later. If a woman is already
married and has older children, some employers will hesitate to
hire her because they believe she is too old to train or does not
have enough "productive" years left to make their investment
worthwhile. Another concern expressed by law firms and a reason
cited for considering a woman attorney "unqualified" is that cli-
ents will not accept advice from a woman. Finally, there is the
belief in almost all the professions that a woman's character and
personality will handicap her performance. In the case of an at-
torney it is often believed that she is not tough or analytical
enough to be "successful."
Although all these professions are for the most part covered
by equal employment opportunity laws which are outlined below,
the status of women as professionals is not equal to that of men.
This inequality results, as has been pointed out, from traditional
attitudes, acceptance of stereotypes, and a general belief that
women are innately unqualified. In a survey of 163 companies"
some of the suggestions offered to foster compliance with equal
opportunity laws and to overcome the above listed obstacles in-
cluded the adoption of effective affirmative action programs, a
national emphasis on hiring and promoting women, and the use
of role models. The authors agree. Some of the ideas and infor-
4
"Id. at 1066.
45In December, 1971, the Bureau of National Affairs conducted a study
among the BNA's Personnel Policies Forum and received responses from
163 nationwide companies. There were ninety-eight large companies with one
thousand or more employees, fifty-eight percent of which were manufacturing,
twenty-eight percent non-manufacturing, and fifteen percent non-business.
In a majority of these firms women accounted for five percent or less of the
first level supervisors, middle management, and professional staffs. How-
ever, fifty-eight percent of the companies stated that they had more women
in management positions than ever before. Three-fourths of the companies
had no women in top management. Cited as obstacles for women were lack
of qualification and education and stereotyped roles or prejudices. Most
companies perceived more discrimination against women in the industry as
a whole than within their own companies. FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL, Com-
pany Policies and Practices 490:601.
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mation presented in this Article are intended to simplify attain-
ment of these objectives.
Several federal and state laws and regulations are relevant to
women and employment practices within the ICJS. At the federal
level these include the equal opportunity provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,"6 the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 Executive
Order 11,246 relating to employment by federal contractors," and
provisions of the United States Constitution.49 At the state level
there are the Indiana Civil Rights Law5" and local ordinances
which regulate employment practices in cities and counties." The
following is a brief introduction to the relevant portions of each.
An analysis of frequently raised issues is deferred until later.
Basic to any understanding of equal opportunity laws is Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act." Not only does it provide that
it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge an individual because of race, color,
sex, religion, or national origin, but also it bans discrimination in
compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 3
More importantly, Title VII was amended in 1972 to include state
and local governments as well as educational institutions in their
4642 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973) [here-
inafter referred to as Title VII].
4 7Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970) ; Equal Pay Amend-
ments of 1972, id. § 213(a) (Supp. III, 1973) ; Fair Labor Standards Amend-
ments of 1974, Act of April 8, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a) (2), U.S. Code
Cong. & Adm. News 615, 619 (1974).
48Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
4 9E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
50 IND. CODE §§ 22-9-1-1 to -12 (Burns 1973).
51E.g., BLOOMINGTON, IND., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 2.60.010 to .100 (1972).
5242 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973).
Since the July 2, 1965, effective date there has been a wealth of articles ex-
plaining the ramifications of this statute, detailing various case law de-
velopments, and recommending future changes. For a fairly complete pre-
1972 amendment article, see Developments in the Law: Employment Discrim-
ination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REV.
1109 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. A fairly detailed bibli-
ography may be found in 1 WOMEN'S RTS. L. RPTR. 78 (Winter-Spring 1972-
73).
"342 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1970). The Act further provides that it
is unlawful for an employer
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any in-
dividual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a) (2) (Supp. III, 1973) (emphasis added).
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roles as employers. 4 One particular provision of Title VII which
affects most sex discrimination cases is the section dealing with
the bona fide occupational qualification (bfoq) . This provision
allows an employer to hire or to employ persons on the basis of
their sex only in those limited circumstances in which the em-
ployee's sex is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise." 6 However, this exception
has been very narrowly construed by the courts 7 and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as well."
54Id. § 2000e (b) defines an employer as "a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day
in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding cal-
endar year. . . ." An "employee" is defined as
an individual employed by an employer, except that the term
"employee" shall not include any person elected to public office in
any State or political sub-division of any State by the qualified voters
thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's
personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an
immediate advisor with respect to the exercise of the constitutional
or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the pre-
ceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service
laws of a State government, governmental agency or political sub-
division.
Id. § 2000e(f) (emphasis added).
"
5Id. § 2OOe-2(e) (1).
5 6
1d.
57The first test of the EEOC's position and guidelines, see note 58 infra,
was Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969),
which held that an employer must show a factual basis for his belief that
women as a class would be unable to perform the job, which in that case
involved lifting weight over thirty pounds. However, the Weeks decision
did not go as far as it should have since the court would apparently uphold
the rule if "substantially all" women could not perform. This standard is
still based on characteristics associated with one sex, not individual capabilities.
For other weight and hour limitation cases, see Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive
Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Cheatwood v. South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 303 F. Supp. 754 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 293
F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968), a!f'd, 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
Another case interpreting the bfoq is Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971), which held
that customer preference was irrelevant in determining whether men were
suitable for the job of flight cabin attendant. Essential to the court's holding
was a very narrow definition of the job.
A narrow interpretation of the bfoq exception is necessary if Title VII
is to retain its force since it provided a potential loophole for employers who
wish to continue discriminatory practices. Although inconsistent decisions
were common during the first years of litigation, most courts accept the
notion that the proof of a bfoq cannot be made by a commonly held stereotype.
"
8Title VII created the EEOC which is charged with the responsibility
of administering the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970), as amended, (Supp.
III, 1973). The Commission has the duty to seek voluntary conciliation of
disputes; to bring civil actions against noncomplying employers, unions, and
19741
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
The bfoq provision and the apparent need for its continual
interpretation illustrates that the law generally, and equal oppor-
tunity laws in particular, must deal with many myths about women
workers. For example, women are often considered emotionally
unstable and physically weak; hence, it is deemed necessary to
protect them from physical and moral hazards. Or, since women
really do not need to work, they are unlikely to be long-term
employees. These and other traditional attitudes and stereotyped
notions about women do not form the basis for a valid bfoq ex-
ception. "Sex" itself is the occupational qualification. "It is only
where the intrinsic attributes of one sex or the other are a neces-
sary qualification for the job that the bfoq clause should come
into play."'59 The policies expressed in Title VII and the EEOC's
employment agencies, id. § 2000e-5 (f) (1) (Supp. III, 1973); and to promul-
gate guidelines, id. § 20O0e-12(a) (1970). In the nine year history of the
EEOC, the Commission has twice changed its position on the bfoq, especially
in relation to state protective laws. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(b), (c) (1966);
29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(b)(1), (2) (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(b) (1973). Today
its position is very clear. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1973) states:
The Commission believes that the bona fide occupational qualification
exception as to sex should be interpreted narrowly. Labels--"Men's
jobs" and "Women's jobs"-tend to deny employment opportunities
unnecessarily to one sex or the other.
(1) The Commission will find that the following situations do
not warrant the application of the bona fide occupational quali-
fication exception:
(i) The refusal to hire a woman because of her sex based
on assumptions of the comparative employment character-
istics of women in general. For example, the assumption
that the turnover rate among women is higher than among
men.
(ii) The refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped
characterizations of the sexes. Such stereotypes include, for
example, that men are less capable of assembling intricate
equipment; that women are less capable of aggressive sales-
manship. The principle of nondiscrimination requires that
individuals be considered on the basis of individual capacities
and not on the basis of any characteristics generally at-
tributed to the group.
(iii) The refusal to hire an individual because of the pref-
erences of the coworkers, the employer, clients or customers
except as covered specifically in subparagraph (2) of this
paragraph.
59Developments, supra note 52, at 1179. See generally id. at 1176-86.
The nature of the bfoq exception is more easily demonstrated if one re-
members that Congress chose to ignore race-defined differences. An examina-
tion of examples of religion and national origin bfoqs also reveals the
meaning of the exemption. A theology professor at a religious college was
a common example before the 1972 amendment which exempted all employ-
ment decisions by religious institutions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (Supp. III,
1973). This amendment, however, raises serious first amendment problems.
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guidelines lead to the rejection of stereotyped employment deci-
sions. Sex is to be considered irrelevant except in only rare cir-
cumstances. Curiously, the overall policy expressed by this part
of the civil rights legislation is one which is both conservative
and traditional: the "work ethic." That is, if someone wants to
work, no one should put artificial barriers in his or her way.
A second federal statute which relates to women and employ-
ment is the Fair Labor Standards Act.60 Of primary importance
is the 1963 Equal Pay Act" amendment which mandates equal pay
for equal work regardless of sex. The most difficult problems
posed by the statute are encountered in determining whether male
and female workers are actually doing substantially the same work,
and if so, whether any pay differential which exists is based on
factors other than the employee's sex. Within the ICJS, such
problems might arise in the context of whether a woman jail
matron should receive the same compensation as a male turnkey.
In 1972 the Equal Pay Act was amended62 to extend its coverage
to professional, executive, and administrative personnel. Obvi-
ously, the question of whether two executives are doing substan-
tially the same work will pose even more difficult problems. The
1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act6" extend its
coverage to include individuals employed by state or local govern-




Thirdly, there are the provisions of Executive Order 11,24665
which prohibit certain federal contractors from discriminating
against any employee or applicant on the basis of sex, as well as
race, religion, or national origin. This Order also requires "af-
See King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The example
given in Congress was an Italian chef in an Italian restaurant. 110 CONG.
REC. 2549, 2583-93 (1964). This example should be refined to include only
those cases in which the patrons are aware of the chef's nationality and
feel that it is important.
6029 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970), as amended, Act of April 8, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-259, U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 615 (1974).
6
'Act of June 10, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56, amending
29 U.S.C. § 206 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970)).62Act of June 23, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906(b) (1), 86 Stat. 375,
amending 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 213 (Supp. III,
1973)).
6 3Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Act of April 8, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-259, U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 615 (1974), amending 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201-19 (1970).64 Id. § 6(a) (2), U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 619 (1974). See also
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (Supp. III, 1973).
653 C.F.R. 402 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970); Exec. Order No. 11,478,
3 C.F.R. 446 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). The Order covers those con-
tractors who receive more than $10,000.
1974]
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firmative action""6 by employers to ensure that applicants are em-
ployed and that employees are treated equally during employment,
without regard to their race, sex, religion, or national origin.
A fourth federal standard relevant to employment policies
and practices of governmental employers is the Constitution. The
due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment provide some degree of protection against arbitrary dis-
crimination for women who work for state and local governments
or their agencies. 7 The employer not only must provide "equal
protection" but must also allow the woman employee her first
amendment freedoms. Before the recent federal amendments to
Title VII and the Fair Labor Standards Act, these constitutional
protections were very important, although limited somewhat in
their reach."
6 6For a detailed discussion of affirmative action, see text accompanying
note 339 infra. Although the Department of Labor, Office of Federal Con-
tract Compliance (OFCC) has primary authority for enforcement of the
Executive Order, the OFCC has, in many cases, delegated that authority. In
the present case, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has been
designated. See note 341 infra.67The extent of protection provided government employees is presently
unsettled and depends upon the particular issues and facts. Recently the
Supreme Court struck down mandatory maternity leaves for public school
teachers primarily on the basis of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); denied
fifth amendment due process claims by federal employees, Arnett v. Kennedy,
94 S. Ct. 1633 (1974); Sampson v. Murray, 94 S. Ct. 937 (1974); and dis-
tinguished fourteenth amendment claims of untenured college professors,
Roth v. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); cf. Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593 (1972). The Court also upheld the constitutionality of the
Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a) (2) (1970), in United States Civil Service
Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973). How-
ever, the Court let stand a circuit court decision which held that the dis-
missal of non-civil service public employees on the basis of membership in
or support of a political party violated the employees' fourteenth amendment
rights, Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 908, 943 (1973).
For a critique of the use of federal courts as forums for employment-
due process suits, see Mohr & Willett, Constitutional and Procedural Aspects
of Employee Access to the Federal Courts: Promotion and Termination, 8
VALPARAISO L. REV. 303 (1974).681t is more certain that a government employer must provide its em-
ployee "equal protection." Section 1983 has been the usual mode for raising
such fourteenth amendment constitutional questions:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
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Relevant state statutes which regulate employment practices
are the Indiana Civil Rights Law" and various local ordinances.
The Indiana Civil Rights Law provides for equal opportunity in
employment as well as in education, housing, and public conveni-
ences and accomodations in order "to eliminate segregation or
separation based solely on race, religion, color, sex, national origin
or ancestry."' Under the Indiana Law an "employer includes the
state, or any political or civil subdivision thereof, and any person
employing six or more persons within the state,"'. and an employee
is defined as "any person employed by another for wages or sal-
ary.""' This Act also contains authority for cities and counties
to set up their own local equal opportunity commissions."
These laws, although their origins differ, are consistent in
the demands they place upon employers. Their basic aim is to en-
courage, indeed force, employers to review employment practices
and to insure that decisions are made on the basis of individual
capacities and capabilities rather than on stereotyped images and
characteristics. Of course, these statutes and regulations may be
affected by the "police powers" limitation or their status made
dependent upon the legislative authority of the city, town, or
county which enacts them, but they are, the authors believe,
crucial."
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
Thus, when state or individual action deprives persons of rights secured
by the federal Constitution or a federal statute, section 1983 provides a cause
of action for damages and injunctive or other equitable relief. For some
representative cases, see text accompanying notes 286, 293 infra. But just as
the Supreme Court had been hesitant to declare classifications based on
sex unconstitutional until recently, see Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971),
the lower courts have exhibited the same reluctance to apply section 1983.
It is curious that the Supreme Court changed its position at about the same
time that Title VII was extended to government and educational employees
and the Equal Rights Amendment was submitted to the states.
691ND. CODE §§ 22-9-1-1 to -12 (Burns 1974).70 d. § 22-9-1-2.
71Id. § 22-9-1-3(h).
721d. § 22-9-1-3 (i).
731d. § 22-9-1-12. For example, Bloomington's Human Rights Commission
is patterned directly after the Indiana Commission and uses the same language
in its ordinance with similar definitions of "employer" and "employee."
BLOOMINGTON, IND., MUNICIPAL CODE H§ 2.60.010 to .100 (1972).
74Title VII, the Indiana Civil Rights Law, and the Bloomington Human
Rights Commission ordinance have similar procedures, including specific time
limitations, and have established broad remedial powers such as the power to
order affirmative action, reinstatement, upgrading and compensatory dam-
ages. The state and municipal commissions are further empowered to issue
cease and desist orders which are enforceable through appropriate courts.
There are, in addition to those cited, other laws which regulate discrimination
in employment. For example, age discrimination laws exist at both the federal
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III. ICJS EMPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS
In light of this background concerning women and employ-
ment and the general legal environment thereof, this section turns
now to the specific statutory requirements for certain ICJS execu-
tive, managerial and professional positions. In the next section
these specific requirements will be analyzed for their possible
discriminatory effects on women.
A. Law Enforcement Officials
The notion of women in law enforcement is not a new con-
cept in this country. The Los Angeles Police Department began
hiring women for full-time police service in 1910."' Historically
policewomen were hired to assist with adult women and juvenile
suspects.7" Despite media rhetoric to the contrary, the police-
woman's role today has not changed much from those early years.77
Particularly noteworthy, though, is the increasing use of police-
women in rape cases."8
There has been increasing public interest in the status of
women in law enforcement in Indiana."' College coeds in Indiana
and state level. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (1970) ; IND. CODE §§ 22-9-2-1 to -11
(Burns 1974). Furthermore, if a union is involved an employer may be under
other constraints, including a duty of fair representation analogous to the
one under the National Labor Relations Act. United Packinghouse Workers
v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Finally, one commentator has
advanced the argument that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) may properly be invoked
in a suit for sex discrimination and is indeed preferable. See Stanley, Sex Di8-
crimination and Section 1981, 1 WOMEN'S RTS. L. RpTR. 2 (Spring 1973).
In most of the following discussion we will focus on the specific require-
ments and legal interpretations of Title VII since it is the most inclusive and
has the most case law development.
75 E. GRAPER, AMERICAN POLICE ADMINISTRATION 226 (1921); C. OWINGS,
WOMEN POLICE: A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND STATUS OF THE WOMEN
POLICE MOVEMENT 99 (1925).
76E. GRAPER, supra note 75, at 228-29.
7 7P. BLOCH & D. ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 49; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION, TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE POLICE
125 (1967).
78 In 1973 the New York City Police Department established the Sex
Crimes Analysis Unit within the Detective Bureau to handle sex crimes. This
unit is staffed by twenty-six female detectives and is headed by Lt. Mary L.
Keefe. Cottell, Rape-The Ultimate Invasion of Privacy, 43 F.B.I. LAW ENF.
BULL. 2 (May 1974). For a description of Miami's experience, see Garmire,
Female Officers in the Department, 43 F.B.I. LAW ENF. BULL. 11 (June 1974).
7 9See, e.g., Indiana Daily Student, Mar. 8, 1974, at 5, col. 3 (Professor
Backs More Policewomen); Bloomington Daily Herald-Telephone, Mar. 2,
1974, at 8, col. 1 (Opportunities Are Limited in Criminal Justice Field for
Women); id., Feb. 22, 1974, at 10, col. 7 (Ginny Wasser Is County's 1st
Female Candidate for Sheriff); Indianapolis Star, Aug. 8, 1973, at 34, col. 7
(Use of Policewomen in New Jobs Indicated).
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are considering law enforcement careers in increasing numbers."
In contrast, the Indiana State Police has no female officers and
until 1973 accepted applications only from men." Although some
women applicants have passed preliminary screening by the In-
diana State Police, 2 none has yet become Indiana's first state
policewoman." Nationwide, women not only are entering law en-
forcement at the patrol level but also are beginning to move into
positions such as investigators, desk sergeants, and commanders,
as well as into other middle-level executive and management
posts." The scarcity of women at these levels in Indiana seems
to be a phenomenon rare within the ICJS.5 Thus, this study turns
to a survey of the legal qualifications for such middle and upper
level ICJS law enforcement positions to determine if the impedi-
ments lie there.
On March 9, 1945, Indiana's State Police Department was
created by statute" under the administration, management, and
control of the State Police Board with a governor-appointed Super-
intendent of the State Police. The Superintendent is the executive
officer and has general charge of the work of the department.
The express statutory qualifications provide that:
The superintendent shall be selected on the basis of train-
ing and experience, and shall have served at least five (5)
years as a police executive, or have had five (5) years'
experience in the management of military, semi-military
or police bodies of men, to equip him for the position
"
0 Approximately twenty percent of upperclass female undergraduates
majoring in forensic studies at Indiana University, Bloomington in Septem-
ber of 1973 indicated that they plan to seek employment in law enforcement
occupations. V. Streib, Forensic Studies Students and Their Evaluation of
Forensic Studies, October 1973 (unpublished survey report in Department of
Forensic Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana).
O'Bloomington Daily Herald-Telephone, June 20, 1973, at 2, col. 1; Louis-
ville Courier-Journal, Aug. 19, 1973, at A2, col. 1.
The Indiana Civil Liberties Union has recently filed suit on behalf of an
unsuccessful female applicant challenging the state police height requirement
as discriminatory, Crose v. Bowen, Civil No. 74-396 (S.D. Ind., filed July 22,
1974). On September 16, 1974, the Indiana State Police Board voted three to
two to eliminate the 5 foot 9 inch minimum. The minimum, if any, to be
substituted was not revealed. The action by the Board presumably was in
reaction to Crose. Indianapolis Star, Sept. 17, 1974, at 12, col. 1.
2 Indianapolis Star, Sept. 8, 1973, at 24, col. 7.
83Id., Oct. 19, 1973, at 21, col. 2.
84P. BLOCH & D. ANDERSON, supra note 5, at 53; Pogrebin, supra note 4,
at 36.
5 The Appendix to this Article reveals the extreme rarity of women in
law enforcement in Indiana.
86IND. CODE § 10-1-1-1 (Burns 1973).
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and shall possess training in police affairs or public
administration."7
The general tenor of the qualifications indicates that a male
superintendent is contemplated. As noted above, Indiana's State
Police Department has no female officers so of course no women
have served five years as a police executive in that department.
Almost as rare are women who have had five years of experience
in the management of any military, semi-military or police bodies
of men. Thus, the pool of prospective superintendent candidates
with sufficient experience is noticeably short of women. The
statute's training requirement for superintendents seems to be
met by all state police employees, 8 since no police employee is
assigned to regular active duty until successful completion of
training school. 9 The Superintendent, with the approval of the
State Police Board,9 determines the qualifications and prerequi-
sites for the various middle-management positions ' and appoints
persons to those positions."' Thus, as is common in police agen-
cies, state police employees enter at the "patrol" level and work
their way up through the ranks.
In Indiana the office of county sheriff has existed as a con-
stitutional office since November 2, 1948."' Sheriffs serve four
year terms and may not serve more than eight years in any
twelve year period. As county officers, sheriffs are elected by
the voters of the respective counties. 5 Moreover, a candidate for
sheriff must be an elector of the county and an inhabitant of the
county "during one year next preceeding his appointment."9 6
Sheriffs have general police powers within the county, manage
the jail and prisoners therein, and serve court processes.9 ' They
may appoint deputy sheriffs" or county policemen9 9 and, with the
approval of the sheriff's merit board if one exists,' 0 determine
8 7
1d.
88A police employee is an employee of the State Police Department who
is assigned police work as a peace officer. Id. § 10-1-1-2(3).
891d. § 10-1-1-5.
90Md. § 10-1-1-1.
911d. § 10-1-1-3.92Id. § 10-1-1-4.
93 1ND. CONST. art. 6, § 11.
941d.
951d. art. 6, § 2; IND. CODE § 17-3-5-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 49-2801, Burns
1964).
96IND. CONST. art. 6, § 4.
97IND. CODE §§ 17-3-5-2, -3 (IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 49-2802, -2803, Burns
1964).
98 d. §§ 17-3-71-2, -13-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 49-1002, -2805).
99Id. §§ 17-3-14-3, -6 (IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 49-2823, -2825).
10°Id. § 17-3-14-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 49-2821).
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the qualifications and prerequisites for the various middle-man-
agement positions and appoint persons to those positions.'"' Since
the office of sheriff is elective in Indiana, working up through the
ranks is not the sole means of access to that position. Although
most successful sheriff candidates probably have had experience
in law enforcement, the only mandatory requirement other than
those mentioned above is election by the voters.
Township constables are elected for four year terms' 2 and
act as general conservators of the peace' 3 throughout their re-
spective counties' 4 with power to arrest fugitives anywhere in
the state.' 5 Township constables must reside and keep their of-
fices within their respective townships.' 6 As with sheriffs, town-
ship constables are elected, so the qualifications for office are
primarily determined by the voters.
The most prominent category of law enforcement officials
for purposes of this study is chiefs of city police departments.
Chiefs are appointed by the mayor with approval of the board of
public safety in first class cities' 7 of which in Indiana there is
only one-Indianapolis. In Gary,'0 8 Evansville,'0 " Michigan City,"'
and Hammond,"' the mayor has the sole power to appoint the
police chief. Otherwise, police chiefs are appointed by the board
of public safety in larger cities" 2 and by the board of metropoli-
tan police commissioners'' 3 in most smaller cities. A police chief
of any city over 10,000 population must have had at least five
years of continuous service with that city's police department im-
mediately prior to appointment."' The Indianapolis police chief
must be chosen from the ranks of lieutenant and above in that
department,"' and in Hammond the chief normally must be chosen
from the ranks of captain or above.' 16 In Evansville and Michi-
11Id. § 17-3-14-6 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 49-2825).
'
0 2Id. § 3-1-18-1 (Burns 1972).
'
0 3Id. § 17-4-36-2 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 49-3403, Burns 1964). State v.
Clements, 215 Ind. 666, 22 N.E.2d 819 (1939); Wiltse v. Holt, 95 Ind. 469
(1884); Vandeveer v. Mattocks, 3 Ind. 479 (1852).
'
0 41ND. CODE § 17-4-36-5 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 49-3407, Burns 1964).
'
05Id. § 17-4-36-7 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 49-3409).
0 61ND. CONST. art. 6, § 6.
'
0 7 1d. §§ 19-1-7-1, -7 (IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-6204, -6210, Burns 1963).
'
0 8Id. §§ 19-1-21-1, -3(b) (IND. ANN. STAT. §§48-6241, -3(b)).
1091d. §§ 19-1-29-1, -3(d) (IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-6250, -6252(d)).
'Id. §§ 19-1-14-1, -6 (IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-6260, -6265).
I21d. § 18-1-11-2 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6102).
''
31d. § 19-1-34-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6302).
1'1Id. §§ 18-2-1-1.5, 19-1-27-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-1201, -6157).
1'"Id. § 19-1-7-7 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6210).
16Id. § 19-1-14-6 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6265).
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gan City, the appointment to chief can come from any rank,""
as in most smaller cities." 8
Promotion to any rank other than chief requires at least two
years of continuous service with that city's police department im-
mediately prior to promotion. ' 9 Under Indianapolis' merit sys-
tem mental and physical qualifications, habits, conduct, service,
and promotion school grades are considered in promotion selec-
tions.' ° In Indianapolis, the captain of traffic, the chief of detec-
tives, and the inspectors of police are chosen by the Board of
Public Safety upon nomination by the chief of police from the
ranks of lieutenant or above.' 2 ' Evansville and Michigan City have
an elaborate statutory scheme for promotion. In rating for pro-
motion purposes, the grade received on a written examination is
fifty percent of the rating, past performance record is forty per-
cent of the rating, and seniority is ten percent of the rating.' 2
Promotions to any rank for detective candidates are made from
the rank of corporal.'23
Since promotion to an executive or managerial law enforce-
ment position requires prior service with that law enforcement
agency,'24 the fundamental screening takes place at the entry level.
Employment for women at the entry level is outside the scope of
this study but will be considered briefly since it is the first hurdle
for would-be Indiana police executives and managers. Typically
new appointees to large Indiana city police departments must meet
residency, age, police record, education and various examination
requirements.' 5
11Id. § 19-1-29-3(d) (IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6252(d)).
11
8 Id. § 19-1-34-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6302).
''
9 Id. § 19-1-27-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6157).
'
201d. § 19-1-7-3 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6206).
'
2
'Id. § 19-1-7-7 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6210).
'22Id. § 19-1-29-3 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6252).
'
2 3Id. §19-1-29-3(b)(3) (IND. ANN. STAT. §48-6252(b)(3)). In Ham-
mond, promotion is based upon seniority (40%), written examination (40%),
past performance (10%), and personal interview (10%). Id. § 19-1-14-14
(IND. ANN. STAT. §48-6273). Political affiliation is expressly irrelevant
to the promotion decision. Id. § 19-1-14-17 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6276).
'
2 4Id. § 19-1-27-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6157).
'
25E.g., id. §§ 19-1-2-1, -7-1, -21-4, -14-8, -29.5-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-
6106, -6204, -6244, -6267, -6288, Burns Supp. 1974). Typically, pros-
pective officers must: (1) reside in the city of which an appointee, (2) be be-
tween twenty-one or twenty-three and thirty-three years of age, (3) have
no felony convictions, (4) be certified for participation in the pension plan,
(5) pass a preliminary physical and aptitude examination, (6) successfully
complete police candidates' school, and (7) pass an examination covering the
police candidates' school plus physical condition, mental alertness, character,
habits, reputation, aptitude and general fitness.
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As early as 1905 Indiana statutorily provided for women in
policing-at least as police matrons. 2 6 Police matrons' duties in-
clude the search and care of all women prisoners and children
who are arrested and detained in jail or at the station house.
Her duties also include attendance at proceedings involving women
or children. Although the police matron has all the authority of
a police officer, the qualifications for the position are unique:
Such police matron shall not be under thirty-five (35)
years of age, shall be fully qualified and shall be of good
moral character. Before appointment, she must be rec-
ommended in writing by not less than twenty (20) women
and five (5) men, all of whom shall have been residents
of such city for at least five (5) years next previous to
such appointment.""
In 1919 a statute was passed expressly empowering the Indianap-
olis Board of Safety to appoint women as regular members of
the police force.2 8 Moreover, the Indiana Supreme Court held in
1935 that a second class city board of public safety had the au-
thority to appoint a woman to serve in a capacity other than a
police matron."'
With the exception of the special situation of the police ma-
tron, statutory requirements for police applicants apparently do
not discriminate against women and at least in one case expressly
establish women as appropriate candidates. Similarly, there is no
explicit sex discrimination in the qualifications for promotion to
the various ranks, including that of chief. Further analysis of
these laws will be found in the next section of this Article.
B. Court Officials
Indiana court officials-prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
judges-are extremely powerful agents within the Indiana Crim-
inal Justice System. Of course, these officials are lawyers, and the
discrimination against women which has long pervaded the legal
profession in this country 3 ° has had its effect on the role of women
in the courts. Although women are entering Indiana law schools
in record numbers, women law graduates who become criminal
prosecutors, criminal defense attorneys, or criminal court judges
126Id. § 18-1-11-17 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6123, Burns 1963).
127jd
,
'28Id. § 19-1-17-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-6203).
29Snowden v. Stackert, 207 Ind. 442, 193 N.E. 586 (1935).
"
0
°Dinerman, Sex Discrimination in the Legal Profession, 55 A.B.A.J.
951 (1969); Kass, A Woman's View of Law School, 15 STUDENT L.J. 4 (1969);
Sassower, The Legal Profession and Women's Rights, 25 RUTGERs L. REv.
54 (1970); White, supra note 43.
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are still exceptionally rare.' 3 ' Again this section will examine
Indiana's laws to see if the reason lies there, looking at the quali-
fications for prosecutors, defense attorneys, and then judges at
each political subdivisional level.
Women prosecutors are uncommon ' and often are seen as
appropriate primarily for cases involving crimes against women,
particularly rape.' 3 At the state level, the Indiana Attorney Gen-
eral represents Indiana in all criminal cases before the Indiana
Supreme Court.'3 4 By statute, the Attorney General must be a
citizen of Indiana, licensed to practice law in Indiana, and elected
by Indiana voters.'"5 The Attorney General can select and appoint
Deputy Attorneys General who must be citizens of Indiana licensed
to practice law in the state.' 6 In each judicial circuit the voters
elect a prosecuting attorney.3 7 Prosecuting attorneys must have
been admitted to the practice of law in Indiana prior to the elec-
tion and must reside within their circuits.' 6 The office is con-
stitutional'3 and the prosecuting attorney can appoint deputies.
As with the office of sheriff, women qualified to be Attorney Gen-
eral or prosecuting attorney must be elected. No woman in Indi-
ana has ever met that test.
Another court-official position in the ICJS is the defense at-
torney. Any woman admitted to the Indiana Bar is a criminal
defense attorney from that moment on if she wishes to be. Al-
though several states, notably California and New York, are ac-
tively involved in specialization programs to certify only qualified
attorneys as criminal law specialists,'4 ° Indiana still admits all
13'See Appendix.
'
35Apparently Monroe County has the only woman serving as the chief
deputy to a county prosecutor in Indiana. See Ellett, supra note 7.
13 3E.g., id.; Bloomington Daily Herald-Telephone, Feb. 22, 1974, at 6,
col. 1 (Female Prosecutors Get Rape Convictions).
1
3 4IND. CODE § 4-6-2-1 (Burns 1974); State v. Sopher, 157 Ind. 360, 61
N.E. 785 (1901); Stewart v. State, 24 Ind. 142 (1865).
'
35 IND. CODE §§ 4-6-1-2, -3 (Burns 1974).
1
3 6Id. §§ 4-6-1-4, -5-1, -5-2, -5-6, -5-6-1-1.
1
37 IND. CONST. art. 7, § 16; IND. CODE § 33-14-1-1 (IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 49-2501, Burns 1964).
'38IND. CONST. art. 7, § 16; State ex rel. Indiana State Bar Ass'n v.
Moritz, 244 Ind. 156, 191 N.E.2d 21 (1963); State ex rel. Howard v. Johnston,
101 Ind. 223 (1885).
1
39State ex rel. Neeriemer v. Daviess Circuit Court, 236 Ind. 624, 142
N.E.2d 626 (1957); State ex rel. Pitman v. Tucker, 46 Ind. 355 (1874).
'
41The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York is informally certifying lawyers considered eligible for appointment
to defend accused persons under the Criminal Justice Act, and the State Bar
of California issues certificates of specialization in criminal law. See Note,
Chief Justice Burger Proposes First Steps Toward Certification of Trial
Advocacy Specialists, 60 A.B.A.J. 17 (1974).
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new lawyers to the general practice of law.'' An applicant for
admission to the Indiana Bar must (1) be at least twenty-one
years of age; (2) be a citizen of the United States; (3) be of good
moral character; (4) be a graduate of an approved law school;
(5) successfully complete the bar examination; (6) be a bona fide
resident of Indiana; and (7) have the intent to practice law in
Indiana.' 2 In addition, non-Indiana attorneys can be admitted on
foreign license,"4 3 and occasionally applicants are admitted on mo-
tion without examination for military reasons. "
The Indiana Supreme Court appoints another important offi-
cial in the ICJS, the State Public Defender, who must be an Indi-
ana resident and a practicing lawyer for at least three years.' 5
Circuit court judges of certain larger counties also have the au-
thority to appoint public defenders, " ' request the State Public
Defender to provide a defense,'" or contract with a local attorney
or attorneys to regularly provide for the defense of indigent ac-
cuseds.'' A particularly interesting provision is relevant when
the State Public Defender is requested by a circuit court judge to
provide a defense for a particular case: the Public Defender may
defend the case personally, assign a deputy, or appoint "any prac-
ticing attorney who is competent to practice law in criminal cases"
to defend the case."4 " This is the only statutory reference to the
notion that criminal defense work may be a recognizable specialty
not held by all practicing attorneys in Indiana.
Thus, a woman could be a criminal defense attorney so long
as she is admitted to the practice of law in Indiana and is selected
by a criminal client or appointed by a judge. However, Indiana
women lawyers are rare and Indiana women criminal defense law-
yers are more uncommon still.'5 The one striking exception is
Mrs. Harriette Bailey Conn, the present State Public Defender
of Indiana.
""IND. RULES OF PROC., Rule A.D. 3 (Burns Supp. 1974).
'
42Id., Rules A.D. 13, 17, 21. Some of these requirements have been chal-
lenged as discriminatory on the basis of the equal protection clause, e.g.,
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). However, there is no evidence to believe
that these requirements have a disparate effect on women and should therefore
be illegal on the basis of sex discrimination. For further discussion of the
nature of the "disparate effect" argument, see text accompanying note 287
infra.
143 1ND. RULES OF PRoc., Rule A.D. 6 (Burns Supp. 1974).
144Id., Rule A.D. 19.
1451ND. CODE § 33-1-7-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 13-1401, Burns 1956).
14 61d. § 35-11-1-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3501, Burns Supp. 1974).
147Id. § 33-9-11-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3504).
148Id. § 33-9-10-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3509).




Since courts are the center of the Indiana Criminal Justice
System, the judges of those courts are powerful agents within that
system. Women are infrequently judges' for many unarticulated
reasons, but an analysis of Indiana's legal requirements for judges
reveals no explicit bar to women. Qualifications for the judicial
offices of the Indiana Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, cir-
cuit courts, superior courts, criminal courts, county courts, mag-
istrates courts, city courts, and municipal courts-all of which are
involved in the Indiana Criminal Justice System in varying de-
grees-are the next subject of examination. Since 1953 all Indi-
ana judges at both the state and county levels must have been
duly admitted to practice law in Indiana or have had previous
experience as an Indiana judge.'52 Of course, if the. judicial office
is elective the prospective judge must meet the qualifications de-
manded by the voters. Beyond these general judicial qualifications,
certain judicial offices may have specific requirements.
The Indiana Supreme Court has the power to review all ques-
tions of law in criminal cases and to review and revise sentences
imposed. '53 Thus, justices of this court are professionals within
the ICJS. The justices are nominated by the Judicial Nominating
Commission, ' appointed by the governor, ' and then approved
or rejected by the voters every ten years."5 6 Constitutional re-
quirements for nomination are United States citizenship and either
admission to the practice of law in Indiana for not less than ten
years or service as an Indiana county judge for at least five
years. ' Statutory criteria to be considered by the Commission
include legal education, legal writings, reputation in the practice
of law, physical condition, financial interest, public service activi-
ties, and any other pertinent information which the Commission
feels is important in selecting the most highly qualified individ-
uals for judicial office.' 8 The Indiana Court of Appeals is also a
15 1Scutt, supra note 7. Judge Sue Shields, Hamilton County Superior
Court, is described as the highest woman judge in Indiana. See Appendix
to identify the few women judges within the ICJS.
'
52 IND. CODE § 33-13-9-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-6905, Burns 1968).
'
53IND. CONST. art. 7, § 4.
15 4id.
'
55 Id. art. 7, § 10.
156 1d. art. 7, § 11.
1571d. art. 7, § 10.
15 8IND. CODE § 33-2.1-4-7 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-7807, Burns Supp. 1974)
provides that the Commission shall consider the following specific criteria:
(1) Legal education, including law schools attended and post-law
school education, and any other academic honors and awards achieved.
(2) Legal writings, including but not limited to legislative draftings,
legal briefs, and contributions to legal journals and publications.
(3) Reputation in the practice of law, as evaluated by attorneys
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part of the ICJS, since an absolute right of one appeal plus re-
view and revision of sentences is provided in all criminal cases.'59
Constitutional requirements and statutory considerations 6 ' are the
same for the judicial offices of the court of appeals as for the
supreme court, with the additional requirement that court of ap-
peals judges reside in the geographic district to which they are
appointed."'
These qualifications indicate no express sex discrimination,
unless "physical condition" or "any other pertinent information"
are interpreted to allow consideration of the candidate's sex. Of
course, the experience qualification may well have a discrimina-
tory effect on women since, as mentioned above, comparatively
few women have attended law school or accumulated extensive
experience as trial lawyers or judges. As with law enforcement
agencies,'62 Indiana's judicial system normally assumes entry at
a lower level judicial office followed by several years of satisfac-
tory service before "promotion" to the supreme court or the court
of appeals. This factor cannot be ignored in its impact upon
women candidates.
Indiana's circuit court judgeships are constitutional offices' 3
with criminal jurisdiction. ' Constitutional qualifications for the
office are residence within the circuit and admission to the prac-
tice of law in Indiana.'" Circuit court judges are elected by the
voters of the circuit.'6 No other statutory qualifications exist for
circuit court judges, again leaving broad discretion with the voters.
and judges with whom the candidate has had professional contact,
and the type of legal practice, including experience and reputation
as a trial lawyer or trial judge.
(4) Physical condition, including general health, stamina, vigor
and age.
(5) Financial interests, including any such interest which might
conflict with the performance of judicial responsibilities.
(6) Activities in public service, including writings and speeches
concerning public affairs and contemporary problems, and efforts
and achievements in improving the administration of justice.
'59IND. CONST. art. 7, § 6.1601d. art. 7, § 10; IND. CODE § 33-2.1-4-7 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-7807,
Burns Supp. 1974).
'
6 IND. CONST. art. 7, § 10; IND. CODE § 33-2.1-2-3 (IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 4-7713, Burns Supp. 1974).
'62See text accompanying notes 75-129 supra.
'
631ND. CONST. art. 7, § 1.
16"Id. art. 7, § 8; IND. CODE § 33-4-4-3 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-303, Burns
1968).
165 1ND. CONST. art. 7, § 7.
'
661d.; IND. CODE § 3-4-4-1 (Burns Supp. 1974). In Vanderburgh County,




More populous counties in Indiana have superior courts,'6 typi-
cally with judges elected by the voters of that county. '6 8 In the
counties of Allen,1" Lake,'7 ° Saint Joseph,'' and Vanderburgh,'"2
superior court judges are appointed by the governor after nomi-
nation by the Judicial Nominating Commission. To be eligible for
nomination, a person must be domiciled in the county, be a United
States citizen, and be admitted to the practice of law in Indi-
ana."7 3 Eligible persons are evaluated by the Judicial Nominating
Commission on statutory criteria similar to those employed in the
selection of appellate court judges."' Political affiliations are ex-
16 7E.g., IND. CODE § 33-5-10-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-801, Burns 1968)
(Clark County Superior Court); id. §33-5-8-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. §4-601)
(Bartholomew County Superior Court).
'
6 8Id. § 33-5-8-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-601) (Bartholomew County); id.
§ 33-5-9-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-701) (Boone County).
169 IND. CODE §§ 33-5-5.1-30, -39, -41 (IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 4-530, -539, -541,
Burns Supp. 1974).
1




'd. §§ 33-5-40-33, -50, -44 (IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 4-2634, -2651, -2645).
172Id. §§ 33-5-43.5-3, -10, -12, -14 (IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 4-2995, -2995g,
-2995i, -2995k).
'
7 31d. §§33-5-5.1-38(a), 
-29.5-36(a), -40-41(a), -43.5-11(a) (IND. ANN.
STAT. § §4-538 (a), -1936 (a), -2642 (a), -2995h (a)).
'
741d. §§ 33-5-5.1-38(b), -29.5-36(b), -40-41(b), -43.5-11(b) (IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 4-538(b), -1936(b), -2642(b), -2995h(b)) specify the following
criteria.
(1) Law school record, including any academic honors and achieve-
ments;
(2) Contributions to scholarly journals and publications, legislative
draftings, and legal briefs;
(3) Activities in public service, including:
(i) writing and speeches concerning public or civic affairs
which are on public record, including but not limited to cam-
paign speeches or writing, letters to newspapers, testimony
before public agencies;
(ii) government service;
(iii) efforts and achievements in improving the administration
of justice;
(iv) other conduct relating to his profession.
(4) Legal experience, including the number of years of practicing
law, the kind of practice involved, and reputation as a trial lawyer
or judge;
(5) Probable judicial temperament;
(6) Physical condition, including age, stamina, and possible habitual
intemperance;
(7) Personality traits, including the exercise of sound judgment,
ability to compromise and conciliate, patience, decisiveness and
dedication;
(8) Membership on boards of directors, financial interest, and any
other consideration which might create conflict of interest with a
judicial office;
(Vol. 8:297
WOMEN IN THE ICJS
pressly exempted when considering eligible candidates for nomi-
nation.'"" Elected superior court judges are subject to the expec-
tations of voters. The nomination and appointment procedure does
provide express factors for consideration, none of which are ex-
pressly related to the sex of the candidate.
Marion County's Criminal Courts'76 and Hancock County's
County Court 77 represent other county courts with criminal jur-
isdiction. As with most other county court judges, these offices
are elective,' 78 with no particular qualifications save admission to
the practice of law in Indiana. 9 First, second, third, and fourth
class cities have city courts'8" with criminal jurisdiction. 8' City
court judges are elected by voters of the city'82 and typically must
have been residents of the county in which the city is located for
at least one year preceding the election.8 3 Indianapolis has a
municipal court"' with criminal jurisdiction.' Municipal court
judges are appointed by the governor after nomination by the
Judicial Nominating Commission. 6 An eligible candidate must
be admitted to the practice of law in Indiana, be a United States
citizen, have been a practicing attorney or judge in Indiana for at
least five years, and have been a resident and practicing attorney
or judge in Marion County for at least the three years prior to
appointment.' 8 Of the fifteen municipal court judges, only eight
can be affiliated with the same political party. 8
No mention of sex is made in any of the express factors for
consideration of candidates. Although not part of the criminal
justice system, the Lake and Marion County juvenile court judges
may appoint at least three referees, and in the event that such
officials are appointed, one shall be a woman'89 in addition to
(9) Any other pertinent information which the commission feels is
important in selecting the best qualified individuals for judicial
office.
"75Id. §§ 33-5-5.1-38(d), -29.5-36(d), 40-41(d), -43.5-11(d) (IND. ANN.
STAT. §§4-538(d), -1936(d), -2642(d), -2995h(d)).
7-Id. § 33-9-1-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. §4-5701, Burns 1968).
77Id. § 33-5.1-1-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. §4-6401, Burns Supp. 1974).
'
78Id. §§33-5.5-1-1, -9-9-2 (IND. ANN. STAT. §§4-6401, -5725).
1Id. §§33-5.5-1-2, -13-9-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. §§4-6402, -6905, Burns
1968).
180 d. §18-1-14-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. §4-6001).
'
8
'Id. § 18-1-14-5 (IND. ANN. STAT. §4-6002).
1
83E.g., id. § 33-13-11-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-6017).
1841d. § 33-6-1-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-5801, Burns Supp. 1974).
1
8 5 Id. § 33-6-1-2 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-5802).
186Id. § 33-6-1-12 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-5814).
1
8 7 1d. § 33-6-1-30 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 4-5814(a)).
I80 d.
'89Id. § 33-12-2-17 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3116).
19741
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
being a United States citizen and a practicing attorney for a
period of three years.'9" However, the sex of a candidate for judge
of a court.with criminal jurisdiction is not an express factor to be
found within the laws of Indiana.
C. Correction Officials
The qualifications for executive, managerial, and professional
positions within the ICJS corrections subsystem are much more
explicit and detailed than for similar positions in other ICJS sub-
systems. The Indiana Department of Correction" controls most
of this correctional subsystem in the typical modes of probation,
parole, and institutionalization. High educational achievement
and several years of experience are typically required for upper
level positions. Consideration turns first to the various mana-
gerial and executive positions within the Department of Correc-
tion, then to the officers of the various correctional institutions,
and finally to probation and parole officers.
1. Department of Correction Officials
The Board of Correction'"2 determines department policy' 3
and is composed of seven members, including a practicing attor-
ney, a social worker or sociologist, an educator, a psychologist or
psychiatrist, someone familiar with the problems of juveniles, and
two lay members."" Board members are appointed by the gov-
ernor,' 95 may not be officials of the state in any other capacity,
and must be "qualified for their position by demonstrated in-
terest in and knowledge of correctional treatment."'9 " No more
than four out of seven of the board members may belong to the
same political party."7
The Commissioner of the Department of Correction is its
executive and administrative head." 8  Appointed by the gov-
ernor,"' the Commissioner must meet combined requirements of
education and managerial and correctional experience0 0 which are
"1 id.
'"Id. §§ 11-1-1.1-1, -3 (Burns 1973).
92 d. § 11-1-1.1-4.
19 31d. § 11-1-1.1-7.
94 d. § 11-1-1.1-6.
1
5 Id. § 11-1-1.1-5.




°Id. § 11-1-1.1-12 provides that the Superintendent must meet the fol-
lowing specific criteria.
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common to most of the executive and managerial positions within
Indiana's Department of Correction.
The Executive Officer of the Department is chosen by the
Commissioner subject to the approval of the Board of Correc-
tion." ' Also chosen in this way are the Executive Director of
Adult Authority, who has direct supervision of the heads of adult
correctional institutions," 2 and the Executive Director of Youth
Authority who has direct supervision of the heads of juvenile or
youthful offender institutions.20 2 To be eligible for these positions
candidates must (1) "have . . . graduated with a bachelor's de-
gree from an accredited college or university, and preferably be
the recipient of an earned graduate degree" and (2) "have had
eight years full-time paid experience in a correctional system,
[at least five of which] must have been in a responsible super-
visory or administrative capacity."2"4 Graduate training in any
behavioral science, administration, or other field appropriate to
correctional work may be substituted on a year-for-year basis for
general experience, not to exceed two years.' ° 5 The Department's
Division of Probation exercises general supervision over the ad-
ministration of probation in all Indiana courts and is headed by
a Director."°' The Director is employed by the Commissioner with
the Board's approval, is directly responsible to the Director of
Adult Authority, and must possess the same qualifications as the
executive directors, except that only three years of supervisory
or administrative experience are required." 7 The Director of the
Department's Division of Classification and Treatment,O8 em-
ployed by the Commissioner and approved by the Board, must
be "qualified by training and experience to organize and direct
(1) He shall have been graduated with a bachelor's degree from
an accredited college or university and preferably be the recipient
of an earned graduate degree;
(2) He shall have had responsible administrative or supervisory
experience in a correctional system for a minimum of five (5) years;
(3) He shall have had ten (10) years full-time paid experience in
correctional institutional work, parole, probation or social work;
(4) Graduate training in any behavioral science, administration or
other fields appropriate to correctional administration work may
be substituted on a year-for-year basis for general experience not
to exceed three (3) years.
20 1Id. § 11-1-1.1-15.
202Id. § 11-1-1.1-16.
20 3Id. § 11-1-1.1-17.
204Id. § 11-1-1.1-49.205Id.
2 0 6Id. § 11-1-1.1-18.
207Id. § 11-1-1.1-19. For further discussion of probation positions see
text accompanying note 275 infra.20 8IND. CODE § 11-1-1.1-24 (Burns 1973).
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programs of classification, general and vocational education and
other programs of treatment and training designed to promote
the rehabilitation of offenders." ' ° Other specific qualifications
for this directorship are provided by statute.20
The qualifications for the Director of Industries and Farms,2 '
also chosen by the Commissioner with Board approval, are tailored
to the unique duties of the position." ' The Division of Medical
Care and Treatment must be headed by a licensed physician
"qualified by training and experience to supervise and direct the
medical care and treatment of the inmates." ' 3 This division di-
rector must also be appointed by the Commissioner and approved
by the Board of Correction.2 4 The Director of the Division of
Research and Statistics must be "qualified to organize and direct
a staff of professional, technical, and clerical personnel engaged
in collecting, recording, analyzing, interpreting, and presenting
statistical and research data." ' Additional specific qualifications
for this directorship, reflecting the unique duties of the position,
2 09Id. § 11-1-1.1-25.
2
'°Id. The statute provides that:
(1) He shall have been graduated with a bachelor's degree in any
behavioral science from an accredited college or university and
preferably be the recipient of an earned graduate degree;
(2) He shall have had eight (8) years full-time paid experience in
correctional institutional work, parole, probation, social work, or
related fields;
(3) Five (5) of these years shall have been full-time paid work in
a correctional system, three (3) of which shall have been in a re-
sponsible supervisory or administrative capacity. Graduate training
in education or any behavioral science may be substituted on a
year-for-year basis for general experience, not to exceed three, (3)
years.
Note the specific requirement for behavioral science education and the more
liberal policy in substituting graduate education for general experience.
2 1 Id. § 11-1-1.1-36.
V 
2Id. § 11-1-1.1-37 provides:
(1) He shall have been graduated with a bachelor's degree in busi-
ness administration, accounting, industrial management or a suitable
equivalent, and preferably be the recipient of an earned graduate
degree;
(2) He shall have had six (6) years full-time paid experience in
industrial sales or production, three (3) years of which shall have
been in a responsible administrative or supervisory capacity.
Note the fixed requirement for work experience without provision for sub-
stitution of graduate education.
2'"Id. § 11-1-1.1-30.5.
2141d.
2 151d. § 11-1-1.1-33.
(Vol. 8:297
WOMEN IN THE ICJS
are statutory.2 ' The Director of the Division of Administrative
Services" 7 is employed by the Commissioner with approval by
the Board. Qualifications for this position are also set by statute?' 8
The last division with duties relevant to the Indiana Crim-
inal Justice System is the Adult Parole Division within the Adult
Authority?' The Supervisor of the Adult Parole Division is di-
rectly responsible to the Executive Director of the Adult Author-
ity.22 The Supervisor of the Adult Parole Division, as well as
the Director of Work Release,2"' must meet the same general
qualifications as the executive directors of the Adult Authority
and the Juvenile Authority. 2
2. Institutional Officers
The Indiana Youth Center, a medium-security institution for
first offender male felons between the ages of fifteen and twenty-
216
(1) He shall have been graduated with a master's degree from an
accredited college or university and preferably be the recipient of an
earned doctor's degree;
(2) He shall have had five (5) years of research or statistical re-
lated work experience;
(3) His academic and experimental background should suggest an
extensive knowledge of theory and methods of statistical research
and analyses, sources of potential data and methods of presentation,
as well as a demonstrated ability to design and conduct basic research.
Graduate training in any behavioral science, administration, or sta-
tistics may be substituted on a year-for-year basis for the required
work experience, not to exceed two (2) years.
Id.
217Id. § 11-1-1.1-34.
2 18Id. § 11-1-1.1-35.
(1) He shall have been graduated with a bachelor's degree in busi-
ness administration, accounting, or a suitable equivalent, from an
accredited college or university and preferably be the recipient of
an earned graduate degree;
(2) He shall have had eight (8) years of full-time paid experience
above the clerical level in a public or private agency or business or-
ganization in accounting, budgeting, auditing, purchasing, institu-
tional administration, or personnel management. Three (3) of these
eight (8) years shall have been in a responsible administrative or
supervisory capacity.
(3) Graduate training in business or a related area may be substituted




22 1Id. § 11-1-1.1-47.
2221d. § 11-1-1.1-49. For further discussion of parole positions, see text
accompanying note 281 infra.
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five,2" except those sentenced to death or life imprisonment,"'
is a part of the ICJS correctional subsystem. The Superintendent
of the Center is employed by the Commissioner with approval by
the Board, subject to the statutory mandate that such employment
be on the basis of merit only and "without regard to race, sex,
color, creed, place of national origin, or political affiliation." '
Express qualifications for the position are the same as those for
the executive directors.2 "
The Reception and Diagnostic Center," which is part of the
Indiana Youth Center, processes various classes of felons and
recommends the most appropriate correctional institution and the
type of program of correction and training for each offender. " 8
The Center is administered by a director who is appointed by the
Board of Correction and who must have been trained in and have
had experience in the field of penology and correction, including
at least three years of satisfactory administrative experience in
such field." The Center's Classification Board evaluates the di-
agnostic report and then recommends the institution and program
to the Board of Correction which makes the final decision.22 0
Members of the Classification Board are selected by the Board
of Correction"' with no specific qualifications expressed in the
statutes.
The Youth Rehabilitation Facility 2. operates conservation
work camps 33 on state property14 with custody of males not over
twenty-five years of age3 transferred to the facility by the Board
of Correction from another institution." " The Director of the
Youth Rehabilitation Facility is appointed by the Board. " 7 He
must have the same qualifications as the executive directors. " 8
The Rockville Training Center is a minimum security institu-
22 3IND. CODE §§ 11-1-2-9, -3-6-1 (Burns 1973).2241d. § 11-3-6-1.
225Id. § 11-1-1.1-48.
226Id. § 11-1-1.1-49.
27Id. § 11-3-6-5.228Id. § 11-3-6-10.
229Id. § 11-3-6-5. The statute also provides that the director have grad-
uated from an accredited college or university and during his college or uni-
versity training have majored in the field of education or social sciences.
230Id. § 11-3-6-10.
23V/d"
2 Id. § 11-3-5-1.
23 31d. § 11-3-5-2.
234Id. § 11-3-5-4.
2 351d. § 11-3-5-2.
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tion"' for males fifteen to twenty-five years old who have not
previously been convicted of a felony, except those sentenced to
life imprisonment or death.2 4 ° The Superintendent of the Rock-
ville Training Center is appointed by the Commissioner of the
Department of Correction with the recommendation of the Indi-
ana Youth Authority's Advisory Council. 4 ' By statute the Super-
intendent must be a graduate of an accredited college or univer-
sity and have had six years of experience in correctional insti-
tutional work, parole, probation or social work, four of which
shall have been in a correctional system. Of the latter four years,
three must have been in a responsible supervisory or administra-
tive position in a correctional institution.2 "
The Department of Correction may establish and operate
community correctional centers as part of the state correctional
system.4 3 Superintendents of such centers are appointed by the
Commissioner with approval of the Board.4 4 As with all super-
intendents of the various other correctional institutions, employ-
ment is on the basis of merit without regard to race, sex, color,
creed, place of national origin, or political affiliation. 4 Educa-
tional and experience qualifications are the same as those for the
executive directors.2 6
The ICJS has four other correctional institutions for boys
and male adults. The Indiana State Prison incarcerates males con-
victed of treason or murder in the first or second degree, all
convicted male felons thirty years of age or older, and all males
transferred thereto.14 7 The warden of the prison is employed by
the Commissioner, with approval by the Board of Correction, 48
on the basis of merit only and without regard to race, sex, color,
creed, place of national origin, or political affiliation2 4  The In-
diana Reformatory incarcerates males between the ages of six-
teen and twenty-nine who are convicted of felonies other than
treason or murder in the first or second degree.2 0 The Indiana
23 91d. § 11-3-7-2.
2401d. §§ 11-1-2-9, 
-3-7-1.
2 41Id. §§ 11-1-2-11, 
-1-2-12, -3-7-3.
2421d. § 11-3-7-3. The statute provides that graduate training in any
behavioral science, administrative or other field, appropriate to correctional




2 44 1d. § 11-1-5-4.
2 45Id. § 11-1-1.1-48.
24 6Id. § 11-1-1.1-49.
2 47Id. § 11-2-3-2.
2 481d. § 11-1-1.1-47.





State Farm2"' is charged with custody of males over eighteen years
of age.2 2 The Indiana Boys School... accepts commitment of boys
between twelve and eighteen years of age" 4 and confines them
until they reach the age of twenty-one unless released sooner. "
The qualifications for the Warden of the State Prison and the
superintendents of the three latter institutions are the same as
those for the executive directors. " 6
Two correctional facilities for girls and women exist in In-
diana, the Indiana Women's Prison,25 7 which incarcerates women
over eighteen5 8 who are convicted of criminal offenses and sen-
tenced to imprisonment, " and the Indiana Girls School, 6 0 which
accepts commitment of girls between twelve and eighteen years
of age and confines them until they reach the age of twenty un-
less released sooner."' The qualifications for the superintendents
of both institutions are the same as for the executive directors.2
Counties may certify homes for friendless women, " but no statu-
tory mention is made of qualifications of supervisors.
Additionally each county in Indiana is required to maintain
a county prison or jail" under the direction of a county sheriff."
The grand jury, at each term of the circuit court, inspects the
county jail and reports complaints or recommendations to the
county's board of commissioners.2 " The Indiana Department of
Correction formulates and prescribes rules and regulations for
county jails to be adopted and enforced by the circuit court.2 6
Counties may also establish and maintain a county workhouse. "
If established, the workhouse is to be managed by a superinten-
dent, who must be "some proper person" employed by the county
board of commissioners.6
251d.
252Id. §§ 11-2-5-4, -3-1-2.
2 5 31d. §§ 11-3-1-1, 
-3-1.
254 1d. §§ 11-3-1-2, 
-1-3, -1-4, -2-3.255Id. §§ 11-3-1-8, 
-2-8, 
-4-2.
2-16Id. §§ 11-1-1.1-48, 
-49.
2 57Id. § 11_4-1-1.
25 1d. §§ 11-4-5-1, -4-7-3.25 91d. § 11-7-3-2.
6 1d. § 11-4-1-1.
2 611d. § 11-4-5-1.




6 41d. § 11-5-1-1.
2 651d. § 11-5-1-3. The qualifications for sheriff are discussed in the text
accompanying note 93 supra.
266IN. CODE § 11-5-1-2 (Burns 1973).
2 671d. § 11-5-3-2.
2 68Id. § 11-6-1-1.
26 91d. § 11-6-1-2.
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Qualifications for police matrons have been earlier mentioned
but the position is more properly placed in the correctional sub-
system. The prison matron is appointed by the county sheriff""0
and must be "at least twenty-one years of age, able bodied, fully
qualified and of good moral character. 27. Although no direct
qualification of female sex can be found in the statutes, the re-
peated use of pronouns "her" and "she, 272 the term "matron,"
and the comparison of prison matrons to women officials in other
institutions " indicate that the legislature assumed that the prison
matron would be a woman. Indeed if the county has no police
matron, it must still employ a person
to receive, take charge of, search, and properly care for,
at the county jail, city prison or other detention centers
within the county, all female prisoners and all children
under the age of fourteen (14) years, who have been
arrested and detained in the county jail, city prison, or
other detention centers.74
3. Probation and Parole Officers
Probation officers are appointed by and serve under the
judges of circuit courts, criminal courts, city courts, and munici-
pal courts2 ' 7 The Division of Probation of the Department of
Correction prescribes minimum standards for the operation of
probation practices, selection of probation personnel, and estab-
lishment of salary levels."' More precisely, a probation practices
and standards committee 27 7 prepares minimum qualifications for
entering probation work.27 Members of the committee are ap-
pointed by the Director of the Division of Probation and the com-
mittee must consist of two judges with juvenile jurisdiction, one
chief probation officer with administrative responsibility for an
adult probation department, one chief probation officer with ad-
ministrative responsibility for a juvenile probation department,
and one probation officer from an adult probation department. " '
To be eligible for appointment as probation officers, candidates
270 d. § 11-5-4-6.
271Id. § 11-5-4-5.
2721d. §§ 11-5-4-1 to -6.2721d. § 11-5-4-7.
274Id. § 11-5-4-1.
275E.g., id. §§ 35-7-2-3, -2-6, -3-1 (IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 9-2212, Burns Supp.
1974, -2214a, Burns 1956, -2214b, Burns Supp. 1974) ; Noble County Council v.
Fifer, 234 Ind. 172, 125 N.E.2d 709 (1955).
276IND. CODE § 35-7-5.1-5 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2919, Burns Supp. 1974).
2 77 1d. § 35-7-5.1-6 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2920).
2 78 1d. § 35-7-5.1-7 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2921).
2 7
91d. § 35-7-5.1-6 (IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-2920).
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must meet the minimum qualifications established by the proba-
tion practices and standards committee and successfully complete
a competitive examination conducted by the Division of Proba-
tion."'0
The Adult Parole Division maintains a staff of parole offi-
cers for parolees from adult institutions, employed "only on the
basis of merit.... Thus, parole agents work for the Indiana De-
partment of Correction and are employed through the merit sys-
tem for state employees. These probation and parole positions
are particularly important since they may serve as entry level
jobs for women seeking employment in corrections. It should be
noted that these positions do have a substantial number of women
as compared to other ICJS positions."
IV. DISCRIMINATION IN ICJS EMPLOYMENT
With the preceding exposition of statutory qualifications for
various ICJS executive, managerial, and professional positions as
a foundation, this section now examines those qualifications for
implicit discriminatory effect. While it appears that none of
these statutes expressly prohibit or hinder women from serving
in those positions, some of the requirements may implicitly dis-
criminate against women. Furthermore, implicit employment dis-
crimination against women in a subtle, personal mode may be
discerned. In sum, the authors believe that women have been
discriminated against in the employment of ICJS executives, man-
agers, and professionals-not formally through statutory qualifi-
cations but rather by subtle and informal beliefs and judgments.
This section will describe a few of the ways in which this dis-
crimination may occur.
In applying federal and state employment statutes to specific
positions in the ICJS, it is apparent that almost all of the posi-
tions in this study are covered by each of the laws. At the law
enforcement level all line officers are covered except elected sher-
iffs who are exempt.28 While it might be argued that the chief
of police could be included under the relatively recent "policy
2801d. § 11-1-1.1-20 (Burns 1973).
28
'Id. § 11-1-1.1-56.
282See Appendix.283See note 54 supra. However, neither Executive Order 11,246 nor the
Indiana Civil Rights Law specifically exempts elected officials or their staff.
While the employer of an elected official may be the electorate, which is not
mandated to avoid discrimination, the personal staff of such as elected official
would seem to be covered. Thus the distinction drawn in this section would be
applicable only if Title VII was the sole law relevant to a particular case.
Since Title VII is the most pervasive and well-known, most of our comments
will be direeted toward its coverage, language, and judicial interpretation.
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maker" exemption of Title VII,28 ' the exemption is, by its lan-
guage, directed toward members of a politician's personal staff
and should not be read to include the chief of police. In the court
officials section of the ICJS the county prosecuting attorney is
exempt from Title VII since the office is elective; however, prob-
lems arise as to the status of the position of deputy prosecuting
attorney. On the one hand, a deputy could arguably be considered
"an appointee on the policy making level" with respect to impor-
tant decisions about tactics or decisions as to whether to prose-
cute various kinds of cases. On the other hand, to accept such an
argument in this instance could lead to an unwarranted enlarge-
ment of the exemption since almost all employees must make de-
cisions which ultimately affect his or her employer's policies. The
exemption should be narrowly construed. For example, in coun-
ties with rather large staffs in the prosecutor's office, the chief
deputy may be directly involved with policy decisions and thus
be exempt; however, other deputies with lesser responsibilities
would not come within the exemption. At the state level, a simi-
lar analysis could be made with respect to the Attorney General's
staff. Obviously, there is nothing to prevent the state, county,
prosecuting attorney, or Attorney General from pursuing an
equal opportunity program; the question is whether or not it is
mandatory.
ICJS judges are both appointed and elected. While elected
judges are exempt, appointed judges are not and are therefore
"employees" under Title VII. Likewise, the public defender and
staff are included in the coverage of Title VII. The catch-all cate-
gory of practicing attorneys is covered at three levels: the law
schools' responsibilities, the state bar's testing and admissions
programs, and law firms' employment and promotion practices.
Finally, the positions in the corrections field discussed in
this Article are all covered by the equal opportunity laws. As
with line officers in law enforcement, equal employment oppor-
tunity for these positions is crucial since promotion to top execu-
tive and administrative jobs is dependent upon experience at
lower levels.2 8
Given the applicability of equal opportunity laws to most po-
sitions in the ICJS, the relevant case law should be of interest
to those charged with employment decisions. Although there are
very few cases which raise direct questions about employment of
284Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Act of April 8, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-259, § 6(a) (2), U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 619 (1974), amending
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970).
285See text accompanying note 124 supra.
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women in criminal justice positions," ' there are several which
are applicable to women and employment in any field. Often these
cases deal with the issues of seemingly neutral standards, except
in cases of explicitly separate job lines. The concept of unlawful
discrimination implicit in neutral standards is crucial to under-
standing employment in the ICJS, since the exclusion of women
is not by formal or overt decisions.
One neutral standards issue involves the legality of height
and weight requirements imposed for law enforcement officers
and sometimes informally for persons at correction institutions."'
Although height and weight requirements are neutral on their
faces and do not explicitly exclude women, the effect of such re-
quirements may have a discriminatory impact which also violates
equal employment opportunity policy. For example, if a law en-
forcement agency has a height requirement of 5 feet 9 inches for
2861In addition to cases discussed here, several cases have been filed alleg-
ing general sex discrimination. The Suffolk County Police Department has
been charged by the National Organization for Women with discrimination in
recruiting, testing, hiring, and promotion and in terms, conditions and privi-
leges of employment. SPOKESWOMAN, Mar. 15, 1964, at 3. The Justice Depart-
ment has filed suit against the Chicago and Buffalo, N.Y., municipal police
departments, alleging discrimination against women in employment oppor-
tunities and conditions of employment. LEAA Newsletter, November 1973,
at 24.
In City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n, 4 Pa.
Commw. 506, 287 A.2d 703 (1972), a trial court decision for the woman plain-
tiff who had been denied the opportunity to apply for a job with the park
police was reversed. The court ruled she must first apply to be a regular police
officer and hinted separate job lines-policewoman-policeman-would be
subject to challenge. Apparently park patrol was considered to be a police-
man's job.
In Wood v. Mills, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1347 (S.D.W. Va. 1973), the
court upheld an "equal pay" complaint by a woman deputy sheriff (jail ma-
tron) who was paid less than a male jailor. An injunction against further
differentiation issued but the court denied any back pay award.
There are also a few cases involving procedural issues. Wright v. Nichols,
7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 196 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (class action, section 1988
challenge survived motion to dismiss even though named plaintiff resigned);
O'Brien v. Shrimp, 356 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (section 1983 cause of
action stated when sheriff refused to consider women for position of deputy
sheriff).
287Although not found in Indiana statutes, height and weight require-
ments are commonly used by ICJS law enforcement components. See e.g.,
Bloomington Daily Herald-Telephone, June 20, 1973, at 2, col. 1 (emphasis
added) :
The Indiana State Police have announced that applications are now
being accepted from men who want to become troopers .... Applicants
must be U.S. citizens, age 21 to 34, height 5 feet 9 inches to 6 feet 5
inches ....
See note 81 supra.
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all police officers, the fact that promotions are always from within,
coupled with the fact that approximately ninety-five percent of
the female population falls below 5 feet 9 inches,"8 means that
women are effectively excluded from pursuing careers in law
enforcement. That a height standard is neutral on its face is
irrelevant to equal opportunity laws since its effect is exclusion
and discrimination.
One of the Supreme Court's first Title VII cases, Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.,2"' involved the legality of seemingly neutral
job requirements. The plaintiff in Griggs alleged that the em-
ployer violated Title VII by requiring a high school diploma and
a satisfactory intelligence test score for certain jobs. In revers-
ing the lower court, which had found no impermissible discrimi-
nation, the Supreme Court held that both the diploma and test
score standards violated Title VII since neither was shown to be
significantly job related. The Court rested its decision upon a
finding that both requirements operated to disqualify Negroes at
a substantially higher rate than white applicants. Thus the Griggs
test provides that once a plaintiff has established that a pre-
employment standard has a "disparate effect" on a Title VII pro-
tected group, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant employer
to show that the standard is job related. In order for the em-
ployer to satisfy the job related standard, he or she must prove
that the requirement substantially increases the likelihood of suc-
cess on the particular job. Obviously, in order to predict the
chances of success on a job, one must know what the job requires,
how success is to be measured, and what qualities are needed for
successful job performance. This proof must be specific and not
based on general allegations of the test's ability to improve the
overall quality of the work force ' " or upon general notions of
stereotyped abilities or characteristics.2 9 Correspondingly, the
issue in height and weight requirement cases is whether or not
288Note, Height Standards in Police Employment and the Question of Sex
Discrimination: The Availability of Two Defenses for a Neutral Employment
Policy Found Discriminatory Under Title VII, 47 S. CAL. L. Rsv. 585, 588 n.13
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Height Standards]; Smith v. City of East Cleve-
land, 363 F. Supp. 1131, 1136 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
289401 U.S. 424 (1971).
2901d. at 431.
291See Smith v. City of East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131, 1137 (N.D.




they are job related."2 This question was directly faced in Smith
v. City of East Cleveland.93
Smith involved a black woman plaintiff who brought a class
action suit under 42 U.S.C. § 19839 ' challenging various aspects
of police hiring including a height and weight minimum of 5 feet
8 inches and 150 pounds. After considering evidence for fifteen
days, the court carefully detailed its conclusion that the skills,
defined in relation to the police function, were not positively re-
lated to the height and weight requirements presently imposed
but rather were based solely on the stereotype of the large male
police officer. 9" The defendants argued that the most physically
taxing and dangerous of the police duties, the felony related func-
tions, required physical strength, fitness, and agility, long reach
of the arms, as well as the abilities to view crowds, drive a car,
absorb blows, and impress others with physical prowess."' The
court carefully analyzed each function as it related to the height
and weight minimums and perceived no relationship. For exam-
ple, the court found that in most cases the kind of physical strength
required of a police officer was leverage strength-the use of
body mass at a particular angle in order to lift or direct-rather
than brute strength-from mass alone. Since leverage strength,
which is the preferred method of exercising force as a police of-
ficer, 9 ' has little to do with height and weight but depends rather
on conditioning and fitness, 9 the requirements were found dis-
criminatory because they failed to meet the job related test.
292There have been occasional lapses of proof on the plaintiff's side in
neglecting specific allegations and illustrations of the disparate effect. See
Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972). However, the statistics are
available. Secondly, there are evidentiary problems involving statistical meth-
ods to determine what percentage of exclusion violates Title VII. For a thor-
ough analysis see Height Standards, supra note 288, at 596-602.
293363 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
29 4Alleging violation of her fourteenth amendment rights, the plaintiff
did not use Title VII. The court's standard of review was basically constitu-
tional, inquiring as to whether the requirements of height and weight were
rationally related to a valid state interest under the recent holdings of Fron-
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971),
which the court found in this case to mean that the 5 foot 8 inch and 150
pound minimums must be demonstrably related to job performance. 363 F.
Supp. at 1136-38.
995363 F. Supp. at 1138.
296Id. at 1141.
2 97Id. at 1139. Brute force is more likely to result in injury to the officer
and the person restrained.
298Id. at 1138-39. In fact where there is a relationship between height and
leverage strength it is negative, that is, the taller person is at a disadvantage
because of less effective leverage.
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Another example of the court's inquiry was its evaluation of
the police department's most crucial argument: the unmeasurable
advantage of height in its ability to impress others. The police
department considered the advantage of its requirement to be the
psychological impact of having all officers over 5 feet 8 inches.
The department theorized that if an officer were taller than the
person being controlled or arrested, the shorter person would be
deterred from assaulting the officer by his or her apparent physi-
cal superiority. According to the court the facts offered by the
department did not substantiate these claims and in fact indicated
size was no deterrence.29 9 Although Smith is not the only case'"
which deals directly with height and weight requirements for law
enforcement officials, it closely follows the reasoning and stan-
dards of proof these issues raise in other areas." 1 Because of its
careful analysis, Smith deserves special attention.
Another issue which often arises in employment discrimina-
tion cases which are applicable to women in the ICJS involves
pregnancy and maternity leaves. Discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy or childbearing is clearly discrimination based on sex
since only women can become pregnant and bear children 2 ' Al-
29 91Id. at 1140.30
°Contra, Hardy v. Stumpf, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1078 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
Alameda County 1972), in which the court held all requirements, including
height and weight, were not unreasonable and were directly and reasonably
connected and necessary to the normal performance of duties of police patrol-
men. However, the invaluable detail and analysis of Smith is not evidenced
in Hardy. Therefore, the authors believe Hardy is subject to attack for failure
to review stereotyped rationalization for classifications based on sex. Appar-
ently the police force in Hardy was segregated. See text accompanying note
327 infra.
3 0
'See EEOC Decision No. 74-25, Sept. 10, 1973, in 2 CCH EMPL. PRAC.
GumE 1 6400 (municipal fire department's 5 foot 7 inch minimum held illegal
under Title VII); Dominquez v. Board of Fire & Police Comm'rs, in 2 CCH
EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 5199 (1973) (Illinois Fair Employment Practice Com-
mission held police department's 5 foot 8 inch height minimum illegal under
state act); Pa. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 57, in 2 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 5177
(1973) (state police 5 foot 6 inch minimum suspended until demonstrated to
be job related) ; Moore v. City of Des Moines Police Dep't, in 2 CCH EMPL.
PRAC. GUIDE 5184 (July 11, 1973) (Iowa Civil Rights Commission held police
department's 5 foot 9 inch height minimum illegal under state act); EEOC
Decision No. 72-0284, Aug. 9, 1971, in CCH EEOC Decisions 6304 (1973)
(5 foot 6 inch minimum for airline flight purser violated Title VII) ; EEOC
Decision No. 71-2643, June 25, 1971, in CCH EEOC Decisions 6286 (1973)
(employer's 5 foot 7 inch minimum violated Title VII); EEOC Decision No.
71-1529, April 2, 1971, in CCH EEOC Decisions 6231 (1973) (employer's
5 foot 7 inch minimum violated Title VII); EEOC Decision No. 71-1418, Mar.
17, 1971, in CCH EEOC Decisions 1 6223 (1973) (5 foot 5 inch factory worker
requirement invalid).
:
02See LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972),
alf'd, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7,
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though the specific employment requirements in the ICJS do not
deal with pregnancy or leaves, the question of how to deal with
pregnant women workers is invariably raised in a discussion of
the general characteristics and problems of women workers. In
fact, it often appears that this one distinctive biological feature
of women is uppermost in employers' minds. Given traditional
attitudes about women and "their proper place" it is not surpris-
ing that once a woman becomes pregnant the conflict between
home and work is resolved by the employer in favor of the for-
mer. What is surprising is that women are often penalized or
considered unqualified because they might become pregnant. 3
For example, it is not inconceivable that an employer would argue
that a woman does not fulfill the "general physical fitness" re-
quirement of some criminal justice positions.. 4 since she may be-
come pregnant. However, to deny a woman a job on this basis
is clearly unacceptable and illegal unless the employer also denies
jobs to men who may become temporarily disabled."'
In 1972 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
issued new guidelines which deal with fringe benefits as well as
pregnancy and childbirth.0 6 The provisions state that a refusal
Civil No. 73-339 (D. Ore., Apr. 25, 1974). Contra, Cohen v. Chesterfield County
Bd. of Educ., 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973) (en banc), rev'd, 414 U.S. 632
(1974). But see Geduldig v. Aiello, 94 S. Ct. 2485 (1974).
30 3T. HAYDEN, PUNISHING PREGNANCY: DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION,
EMPLOYMENT, AND CREDIT 1 (ACLU Reports 1973), a comprehensive pre-
LaFleur case study of pregnancy and employment policies.
3 04See text accompanying notes 125 (police officers), 153 (candidates for




50f course, the problem is even more crucial when a woman applicant
or candidate is already pregnant. Most employers refuse to consider such an
applicant; the question is whether or not the employer also never considers
men with present, temporary disabilities, such as a hernia. See T. HAYDEN,
supra note 303, at 58.
30629 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1973) provides:
(a) A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which ex-
cludes from employment applicants or employees because of pregnan-
cy is in prima facie violation of title VII.
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage,
abortion, childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related
purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as such under
any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan avail-
able in connection with employment. Written and unwritten em-
ployment policies and practices involving matters such as the com-
mencement and duration of leave, the availability of extensions, the
accrual of seniority and other benefits and privileges, reinstatement,
and payment under any health or temporary disability insurance or
sick leave plan, formal or informal, shall be applied to disability due
to pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they
are applied to other temporary disabilities.
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to hire an applicant because of pregnancy violates Title VII and
may be justified only under the bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion exception. They further provide that pregnancy is to be
treated as any other temporary disability is treated by the em-
ployer and thus in most cases a paid leave of limited but ade-
quate duration must be available." 7 The authors suggest that
discussion concerning whether pregnancy is properly defined as
an illness, whether it is voluntary, or whether a pregnant worker
will defraud her employer is irrelevant and useless. If an em-
ployer has a policy which covers its employees' temporary physi-
cal conditions, such a policy should be extended to the physical
condition of pregnancy. Although these guidelines have not, as
yet, been subject to Supreme Court challenge,0 8 they were recog-
nized in the latest relevant Court case.
(c) Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily dis-
abled is caused by an employment policy under which insufficient
or no leave is available, such a termination violates the Act if it has
a disparate impact on employees of one sex and is not justified by
business necessity.
Id. § 1604.9 provides in part:
(a) "Fringe benefits," as used herein, includes medical, hospital,
accident, life insurance and retirement benefits; profit-sharing and
bonus plans; leave, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate between men and women with regard to fringe benefits.
(d) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
make available benefits for the wives and families of male employees
where the same benefits are not made available for the husbands
and families of female employees; or to make available benefits for
the wives of male employees which are not made available for female
employees; or to make available benefits to the husbands of female
employees which are not made available for male employees. An ex-
ample of such an unlawful employment practice is a situation in
which wives of male employees receive maternity benefits while
female employees receive no benefits.
(e) It shall not be a defense under title VII to a charge of sex dis-
crimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is greater with
respect to one sex than the other.
307See, e.g., Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, Civil No. 73-
339 (D. Ore., Apr. 25, 1974); T. HAYDEN, supra note 303, at 58. One woman
police officer is suing the Chicago Police Department for back pay withheld
during her pregnancy. Bloomington Daily Herald-Telephone, Jan. 10, 1974,
at 5, col. 1.
308 There have been lower court challenges in which the guidelines were




In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,30 ' the Court
struck down mandatory maternity leave policies for public school
teachers in two school districts as violative of the teachers' four-
teenth amendment due process rights.1 Although the nature of
the leave policies varied in the cases before the Court, as had
policies subject to earlier lower court decisions," ' both provided
a mandatory leave for a specified number of months, without pay,
and with little job security. What is relevant for the purposes of
this Article is that the Court found administrative convenience
unacceptable as a basis for so dealing with pregnant employees.
Such a view should likewise be adopted by ICJS employers. They
should trade in their stereotyped notions about pregnant workers,
and women generally because of their possibilities of becoming
pregnant, and replace them with individual determinations. The
fact of pregnancy or even the presence of children should not in
itself disqualify a woman from any position in the ICJS" '
A third instance of a seemingly neutral ICJS employment
requirement which may be unlawfully discriminatory involves
educational requirements. Although most cases which have held
educational requirements illegal unless specifically validated have
involved race, it may be possible to find sex discrimination if
one sex has been substantially excluded, formally or informally,
from the required educational experience. For example, in the
court officials positions in the ICJS, lawyer status is almost al
ways a prerequisite, yet in the past women have been effectively
excluded from law schools and thus comprise only three percent
of the lawyers in this country." ' The resolution of a potential
309414 U.S. 632 (1974).
3 10The Court did not decide whether the leave should be paid. It should
be remembered that these cases were brought before the public educational
employees amendment to Title VII and thus relied upon the Constitution for
jurisdictional basis. Therefore, the specific issue of Title VII and its guide-
lines was not decided, although obviously the Court recognized the analogous
nature of its opinion. See id. at 638-39 n.8.
3
"See, e.g., Bravo v. Board of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 155 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
Health v. Westerville Bd. of Educ., 345 F. Supp. 501 (S.D. Ohio 1972); Wil-
liams v. San Francisco United School Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
Sinks v. Mays, 332 F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Ga. 1971). For other examples of dif-
ferent policies, see T. HAYDEN, supra note 303, at 37-38.
3 12 0ne highlighting example to illustrate the opposite point of view is
found in T. HAYDEN, supra note 303, at 28:
A senior portfolio analyst at Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and
Smith reports that she was told by her supervisor (a woman) that she
must take maternity leave, as coming to work in a maternity dress
would be like coming to work in dungarees, a "blemish upon the de-
partment." You cannot perform in a man's job while acting like
a woman.
3 13See White, supra note 43, at 1051.
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charge of sex discrimination is not to eliminate the requirement
that to be qualified for a job one must be a lawyer but rather for
the employer to establish that lawyer status is job related. That
is, an employer should prove that a court official's job is per-
formed significantly better by a lawyer. If this standard can be
met there will be no violation of Title VII or any other equal
employment legislation. However, there may yet be a need to
establish an "affirmative action" policy" 4 to encourage more
women, if that is the underrepresented sex, and it is in this ex-
ample, to enter law school, the necessary prerequisite to becom-
ing a lawyer. Without this second step the relative position of
women in the system would be excruciatingly slow to change. The
other step, admission to the bar, must also be a sex-less process
and its job-relatedness should also be specifically established." '
Another form of the discriminatory use of educational re-
quirements is to be found in the employment of informal stan-
dards in hiring practices. For example, an employer may for-
mally require as a minimum that all persons have a high school
diploma but informally never consider a woman with less than
a college degree." 6 Obviously, such a procedure is illegal, but its
opponents may face an evidentially difficult burden of proof. Re-
lated to the problem of educational qualifications are work experi-
ence requirements which, although neutral on their faces, can re-
sult in discrimination. Again, the principles in this area have
come from cases involving race,"1 7 but they are applicable as well
to sex, and the reasoning that should be followed is similar to
that used above in analyzing the effect of educational require-
ments. A key example of this potential problem in the ICJS is
in the field of corrections. To varying degrees, professionals in
the corrections subsystem of the ICJS must meet a minimum edu-
cational requirement and have had a certain specified number of
years of experience in corrections work. This experience may be
gained by work in correctional institutions, in parole, probation,
or social work, or by experience in a related field. 8 Additionally,
3 1 4For further development of affirmative action requirements and legal
bases, see text accompanying note 339 infra.3 
"For a critique of typical bar examinations, see Bell, Do Bar Examina-
tions Serve a Useful Purpose?, 57 A.B.A.J. 1215 (1971).
31 Such informal discrimination is reflected in admission standards in
the military. Ginsburg, The Need for the Equal Rights Amendment, 59 A.B.A.J.
1013, 1018 (1973).
3 1 7E.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123
(8th Cir. 1969) ; Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir.
1969); cf., Dobbins v. Electrical Workers Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.
Ohio 1968). See also Developments, supra note 52, at 1145-50.
318See notes 200, 210, and 242 & accompanying text supra.
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a certain minimum number of years must be in positions admin-
istrative in nature. 19 Although neutral on its face, this work
experience requirement may have a disparate effect on women
if they have been effectively excluded from the fields considered
preparatory. In Indiana several women have positions in proba-
tion, parole, or social work,32 but few have administrative posi-
tions and thus could not qualify. Again, the next step is to estab-
lish the job related character of these requirements and, even if
successfully shown, encourage development of affirmative action
policies to substantially increase the pool of available women. This
same work experience argument can be applied to the entry level
police office position since it also qualifies persons for adminis-
trative and professional positions in the field of law enforcement.2 1
A fourth area of pre-employment inquiry is testing. There
has been considerable literature concerning culturally biased test-
ing which adversely affects Blacks and other minorities,323 but
there have also been occasional allegations of cultural biases ad-
versely affecting women.2 Specifically, in the ICJS, tests are
used for various law enforcement positions, both at the entry level
and for promotions.2 ' It is essential that these tests be legally
and psychologically valid once it is shown that members of a
protected group score significantly and disproportionately lower
than others. This disparate effect is most common in aptitude or
general intelligence tests commonly used for law enforcement po-
sions. Such tests have rarely been validated. 25 The validation
319id.
32 The chart appended to this Article reveals approximately fifty-seven
women in ICJS probation and parole work.32
'See notes 120, 122, and 125 & accompanying text supra.322The most exhaustive article is Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing
Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of
Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1598 (1969). See also Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); E. GHISELLI, THE VALIDITY OF OCCUPATIONAL
.APTITUDE TESTS (1966); R. KIRPATRICK, TESTING AND FAIR EMPLOYMENT
(1968) ; Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in
Employment and Education, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 691 (1968); Developments,
supra note 52, at 1120-40.
323In Smith v. City of East Cleveland, 363 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ohio
1973), the court did not rule on the allegation that promotion tests discrim-
inated against women since too few women had taken the test. See also Mur-
xay, Sex Discrimination and a Legal Education, 22 BRIEF/CAsE 7, 8 (Dec.
1972).
324See notes 118, 120, 122, and 125 supra.3 25See Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Service Comm'n,
482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973) (police); Officers for Justice v. Civil
Service Comm'n, 371 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (police); Fowler v.
Schwarzwalder, 351 F. Supp. 721 (D. Minn. 1972) (fire); Pennsylvania v.
O'Neill, 348 F. Supp. 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd in relevant part by an
equally divided court, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (police).
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procedure to be followed is essentially the same utilized in evalu-
ating any other apparently neutral requirement, with special at-
tention given to proper job analysis, which more effectively en-
ables the testmaker to determine what to test for.2
Another problem which has arisen in other law enforcement
agencies is the use of separate job lines and thus separate lines
of promotion. For example, there may be policeman and police-
woman positions, open only to men and women respectively, which
involve different kinds of tasks. 27 The legal issues involved are
not the rationality of separate job classifications or whether their
use is a good management technique, but rather the exclusion of
one sex from a particular job and the present effect of this past
exclusion once the lines are sexually or racially integrated."' Ob-
viously, since the effective date of Title VII and other equal em-
ployment opportunity statutes and regulations, an applicant may
not be denied a job on the basis of sex, unless the employer estab-
lishes a bfoq exception. Since it is unlikely that a bfoq exception
could be established for law enforcement positions... or for court
and correction officials, sex-segregated job lines must be abol-
ished. The next step is to deal with the present effect of past
exclusion, an issue which arises in determining promotion qualifi-
cations. For instance, if four years of experience at the patrol entry
level is required in order to qualify to take the sergeant's exam,
does four years of experience as a "policewoman" count? Although
this question has been answered variously in cases involving
women police,33 industrial cases dealing with previously discrimi-
326Cooper & Sobol, supra note 322, at 1665-69.
327E.g., this separation appears typical in New York. See Button v. Rocke-
feller, 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 588 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Albany County 1973), and
cases cited in note 330 infra.
328See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Guidelines on Dis-
crimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3 (1973).
329 Height Standards, supra note 288, at 621.
3301n Shpritzer v. Sang, 17 App. Div. 2d 285, 234 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1962),
the court ruled the woman plaintiff qualified to take the sergeant's exam
even though the duties of a policewoman and policeman differed. The primary
force behind the court's decision, it appears, was the desire to avoid con-
stitutional questions. But see Berni v. Leonard, 69 Misc. 2d 935, 331 N.Y.S.2d
193 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 40 App. Div. 2d 701, 336 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1972), aff'd, 32
N.Y.2d 933, 300 N.E.2d 734, 347 N.Y.S.2d 198, cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 551
(1973), which held that one could not take the sergeant's exam until the
applicant had served four years as a patrolman. The question of whether
a woman could be come a "patrolman" was left unresolved as an issue not
before the court.
It is the authors' contention that the Berni case is wrong and in fact
the question of whether the qualifying job was open to women was essential
to the resolution of the case.
1974]
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natory seniority systems are basically consistent. 31 Typically
"plantwide" or "employer" seniority is used for those employees
affected by a previously discriminatory system."' However, new
employees, hired into desegregated positions, are given job senior-
ity and are promoted on the same basis as other employees. For
the most part, the issue of present effects of past discrimination
is one affecting only a small number of employees but for whom
a remedy, carefully and narrowly defined, is essential.
One final issue, which must be raised involves the use of and
reliance on "reputation" or personal references as a job require-
ment. Although references are commonly requested for most jobs,
there is particular mention of this requirement in Indiana for
judicial positions filled by persons nominated by the Judicial Nom-
inating Commission."' In general, requests for references or eval-
uations of reputation in determining whether to hire a particular
person are perfectly lawful and indeed a sensible policy since pre-
sumably the more information an employer has about a person the
better the decision-making process. However, the subjective na-
ture of these evaluations should be recognized and taken into
account when weighing their value.
In some cases the references may be used in order to further
a nepotistic-like policy. 4 If a disparate effect can be shown be-
cause of a nepotistic or extreme anti-nepotistic policy, the courts
have not hesitated to abolish the requirement since nepotism is
in no way job-related. 5 In other cases stereotyped characteri-
zations constitute the problem. Since bias has not been eliminated
from society, it is possible to foresee a situation in which a woman
or a Black does not have a reputation or references equal to a
white man simply because of the lesser values which some mem-
bers of society place upon a woman's achievements. 6 Once again,
33
'E.g., in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969), a
sex separate seniority system was ruled a violation of Title VII. Racially
segregated systems have also been ruled illegal. Local 189, United Paper-
makers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970) ; Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp.
505 (E.D. Va. 1968).3 2See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 322, at 1615-36; Developments, supra
note 52, at 1158-64; and cases cited in note 331 supra.333See text accompanying note 158 supra.
3 4Developments, supra note 52, at 1150.335Asbestos Workers Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 315 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Utah 1970).
Anti-nepotism policies, particularly at universities, which have an ad-
verse effect on women are suspect. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION
AND WELFARE, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, HIGHER EDUCATION GUIDELINES,
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11246, at 8 (1972).
336,, 'The men at the top replicate themselves . . . affinity is all-school
affinity, industrial affinity, club affinity, social class and economic affinity.
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the solution is not to eliminate the requirement of references or
the evaluation of reputation but rather to be cognizant of the
potential discrimination.
The issues which arise in evaluating employment practices
are many and varied.3 3 Some present subjective problems diffi-
cult to resolve speedily, while others are only problems until em-
ployers are conscious of the discrimination. Title VII and other
equal opportunity laws and regulations require a great deal from
employers. They are forced to evaluate all tests and other stan-
dards employed, since all such devices and criteria are presumed
illegal, i.e., discriminatory, until proven lawful, i.e., validated.
Furthermore, employers are mandated to examine their entire
employment process which amounts even at best to educated guess-
ing. However, viewed from a different perspective, these laws do
encourage employers to make employment decisions on as rational
a basis as possible. Their aim is to force employers to review
their employment policies to insure that decisions are made on
the basis of individual capacities and capabilities rather than on
stereotyped images and characteristics. Although the legal man-
date may appear unwarranted to those who feel the goals are
impossible, it is the authors' belief that the goals are feasible
and, in fact, will result in a more effective and responsive crim-
inal justice system. However, the process will require a revision
of the system's perceptions as to who is qualified. Within the
ICJS one should not hear the following:
One personnel chief summed up the [Wall] Street's anti-
woman version of Catch 22 by saying, "You can't be
feminine in this business [stock market]. We're looking
for people who must excel, must win. They must be
very competitive and have strong egos. The popular con-
Women are commonly seen as outsiders.'" Whol, What's So Rare as a
Woman on Wall Street, 1 Ms. 82, 127 (June 1973). See also Murray, supra
note 323, at 8-9; Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Guidelines on Dis-
crimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1) (1973).
3
_
37A different kind of problem can be seen in the suitation described
in Wohl, supra note 336, at 127: Merrill Lynch, a prominent stock-brokerage
firm, has only 150 women among 5,200 brokers because of the lack of
"qualified women." Merrill Lynch seeks "winners" and believes "'the true
winner seldom has a wife who works, for his ego requires that he be the
full suport of the family.'" And a personality test given to all Merrill
Lynch applicants asks whether the candidate objects to "your wife working
outside the home." Obviously a woman cannot be a "winner" on that ques-
tion. Moreover, men who need dependent wives as ego props are unlikely
to view the few women who do get hired as equals. They would hardly be
likely even to view the woman applicant as qualified.
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ception is that women who have these qualities are neu-
rotic. Who wants to hire a neurotic woman?""'
V. RECOMMENDED ICJS AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLAN
In the previous sections of this Article, the authors have
asserted their belief that women are discriminated against in
the employment of ICJS executives, managers, and professionals,
and have detailed a few of the ways in which this discrimination
has been effected. This section describes affirmative action pro-
grams needed to counteract this situation. All ICJS employers
should develop and adopt affirmative action plans. These plans
must be tailored to particular employment situations and, thus,
although it is possible for the state, the counties, the cities, and
the towns to adopt system-wide affirmative action programs to
cover all their respective employees, it is suggested that fur-
ther refinement is required within each unit in order to facilitate
specific but consistent programs.3 9
Affirmative action programs are designed to effectuate equal
employment opportunity policies as expressed in various laws
and regulations. Such programs reduce reliance on a case-to-case
basis for enforcement, provide faster, more effective relief to
affected employees or potential employees, and generally make
equal opportunity a reality, not simply rhetoric. They key to an
affirmative action program is its mandate of a continuing pro-
gram of employer self-evaluation. Plans are written on the basis
of an employer's own requirements, policies, and collected data.
Affirmative action obligations are twofold. First, an employer
must eliminate all present discriminatory practices and conditions.
That is achieved by complying with present equal opportunity
laws. Secondly, an employer must take further affirmative steps
to increase minority group and female participation in the par-
ticular work force. This latter obligation is analogous to a rem-
edy, for it seeks to overcome the present effects of past discrimi-
nation. Thus, a plan is designed to aid not only future or poten-
tial employees but also present employees. The suggested adop-
tion of such plans has a firm foundation; they are required by law.
3 3 8Wohl, supra note 336, at 127. Note the confusion of woman and
feminine.
3 39Obviously excluded from any criminal justice system affirmative
action plan are elected officials, such as prosecutors, sheriffs, and judges.
This exclusion does not, however, indicate any opinion for or against these
offices remaining elective.
A more specific delegation is also apparent in the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration's equal opportunity guidelines, 28 C.F.R. § 42.301
(1973), discussed at note 342 infra.
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The authority for requiring affirmative action plans by ICJS
employers comes from several sources. Of primary importance is
Executive Order 11,246,40 which prohibits certain federal con-
tractors from discriminating against an employee or applicant
on the basis of sex, as well as race, religion, or national origin.
The Order also requires employers to take affirmative action to
ensure that applicants are employed and that employees are treated
during employment without regard to their race, sex, religion, or
national origin. The Secretary of Labor is designated as the ad-
ministrator of these programs but may delegate this responsi-
bility to other agencies. 1 In 1973 the Law Enforcement Assis-
tance Administration (LEAA) of the United States Department
of Justice issued specific guidelines requiring an "Equal Oppor-
tunity Program" relating to employment practices affecting mi-
nority group persons and women from each LEAA assistance re-
cipient which has fifty or more employees and has received grants
in excess of $25,0002"
Authority for affirmative action plans also comes from the
remedy provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Often, before entering into a conciliation agreement with an em-
ployer charged with a violation, the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission will require an affirmative action plan.34 3 In
addition, the Act itself gives the federal courts broad remedial
powers, including ordering "such affirmative action as may be
appropriate. 3 44  If an employer has an implemented affirmative
action plan, the likelihood of conciliation with the EEOC and of
relatively minor, if any, damage awards in court increases.
3403 C.F.R. 169 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).
341
'For example, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has
responsibility for educational institutions and hospitals. The Department of
Treasury has responsibility for banks and other lending institutions.
342Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Guidelines, 28 C.F.R.
§ 42.301 (1973). The guidelines include the further requirement that the
"recipient" be located in a geographic area where the available minority
workforce is three percent or more of the total workforce. Id. § 42.302(b).
It is unclear whether a written plan would be required under these guide-
lines if the minority population in a given area was below three percent
but the female population was significant. One could argue a plan is neces-
sary since the employer engages in separate analyses of each.
It is also possible for an affirmative action plan to be required under
other regulations even though a unit may not be covered under LEAA.
3,342 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(b) (Supp. III, 1973).
344Id. § 2000e-5 (g). Such remedies have been ordered in several police
and fire departments for minorities. See Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053
(5th Cir. 1974) (en bane); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil
Service Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d
315 (8th Cir. 1971) (en bane), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
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Apart from the legal considerations involved in the imple-
mentation of affirmative action programs are the practical bene-
fits that will flow to an ICJS employer. One immediate result
of a viable plan will be an increase in the total number of per-
sons in the applicant pool, thus broadening the base from which
employees come. Additional applicants will afford the employer
more alternatives and increase the likelihood of finding desirable
employees. The reevaluation of employment techniques such a
program entails will also promote better selection practices within
the system. For example, if a pre-employment or promotion test
has not been validated, it may not be furnishing the employer
with any useful information. Test administration is time con-
suming and expensive; if a test has no predictive value, then both
the time and money expended have been wasted. In fact, such a
test or other nonvalidated pre-employment inquiry may well cost
the employer qualified employees. " 5 In short, because an affirma-
tive action plan requires a systematic review of all terms and con-
ditions of employment, policies and practices will be examined
for their effectiveness, a valuable objective regardless of equal
opportunity demands.
The specifics of an affirmative action plan can be quite com-
plex; however, detailed guidelines from appropriate agencies are
available.34 Basic to all affirmative action plans is an evaluation
of the employer's present work force, including the total number
of employees in each position as well as the number of women
and minorities in each. Further, all recruitment and selection
procedures should be examined, and an analysis made by race,
sex, and national origin of the number of persons applying for
employment, accepting employment, applying for promotion, re-
ceiving promotion, and terminating, both voluntarily and invol-
untarily. Finally, information should be gathered to determine
the community and area labor force characteristics, e.g., total
population, work force population, existing unemployment, all with
information as to sex, race, and national origin. For example, if
a city police department recruits city-wide, county-wide, or region-
wide, labor force characteristics from that area are needed. Ad-
ditionally, if an employer requires certain educational achieve-
"'Recent research indicates policemen are typically ranked higher in
categories such as "strong" and "aggressive" while policewomen are thought
to be more "understanding" and "compassionate." P. BLOCH & D. ANDERSON,
supra note 5, at 10. However, women police executives as a group may
exhibit more strength in leadership-associated personality traits than do male
police executives as a group. Price, A Study of Leadership Strength o'f
Female Police Executives, 2 J. POL. Sci. & ADMIN. 219 (1974).346See note 342 supra; 41 C.F.R. § 60-2 (1973).
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ments for employees, as do many in the ICJS, those people with
the appropriate training need to be ascertained.
Once these data have been collected, areas of disproportionate
employment are easily detected. It then becomes the obligation
of the employer to examine those areas of disproportion to deter-
mine if the employment of women and minorities is inhibited by
any internal or external factor. If so, the employer must set about
to remedy the situation. Secondly, once the data is known, the
employer can establish goals and timetables which reflect his or
her decision as to how many women and minority employees are
an adequate balance and predict when these goals will likely be
reached. Finally, a plan should also indicate what positive steps
an employer plans to take to achieve these self-imposed goals." 7
At this point, it should be emphasized that it is an essential
characteristic of the 1970's affirmative action plans that the goals
and timetables are determined internally by individual employers
and not imposed externally by governmental agencies. Secondly,
since the employment problems for women and minorities differ
substantially, there should be a separate analysis and a separate
response for women and for minorities. In the past the typical
problem in terms of employment for women has been under-
utilization; for minorities, cultural biases are usually the key.
As with any recommendation, there are criticisms of affirma-
tive action which need to be explored. First, an issue exists as
to whether "goals" is a euphemism for "quotas." All official
literature carefully avoids the use of "quota," but often employ-
ers act as if any distinction is only one of semantics. However,
in a legal sense there is a difference between goals and quotas,
although both can take the form of concrete numbers. For exam-
ple, a county probation department may set its employment goal
at three women and three men officers when its present compo-
sition is one woman and five men. It is later unable to attain
its goal as a result of having only one vacancy or because after
extending offers to several women, none accept due to locale, so-
cial factors, etc. Such a situation would not be a violation, since
the department could establish its good faith efforts in pursuing
its affirmative action program. On the other hand, quotas are
neither flexible nor subject to a "good faith" defense. The as-
sumption that goals and quotas are identical can in fact have
detrimental effects for both employees and employers. Quotas en-
347As indicated above, all terms and conditions of employment as well
as recruitment are covered by an affirmative action plan. For example, plans
include analysis of grievance procedures, maternity leaves, testing, and pay.




courage employers to hire by sex, race, or national origin alone-
according to body, not ability. Thus, there is in quotas the danger
of hiring unsuitable people who then become dissatisfied employees
because they cannot, for whatever reason, do the job.
This idea that affirmative action will result in a lower qual-
ity of employees forms a second criticism. As indicated above,
correctly written affirmative action plans take into account valid
qualifications. In fact, affirmative action can have the reverse
effect and raise employee quality, since there is an expanded
pool from which to draw. In assessing this criticism one should
not overlook the troublesome nature of the concept of "quality"
itself. That is, how is "quality" to be determined and how can
it be freed from sex-based notions.
A third criticism of affirmative action is that it is unfair
to white males and thus illegal and undesirable as reverse dis-
crimination. 4 ' First, once an affirmative action plan is in effect,
there is nothing to prevent an employer from hiring a white male,
but the deck may no longer be stacked in his favor. Secondly,
to hire or to promote only on the basis of sex-either sex-is
unlawful.34 9  Reverse discrimination is discrimination. Finally,
it is possible that in the past some unqualified people were hired
or promoted. To the extent that is true, the adoption of affirma-
tive action may have an adverse impact on these types of people.
Once an affirmative action plan is adopted, it is important
that it be communicated and explained to all employees. In order
to deal with the inevitable anxieties of present employees, the
person responsible for equal opportunity must be given sufficient
authority. Furthermore, compliance with the plan by employees
should be recognized in any reward system of the employer as
is any other action which promotes the agency. Although initially
an affirmative action plan results in considerable expenditures of
34 0The legality of a more strict affirmative action plan was upheld
in Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971)
(Philadelphia Plan with specific ranges imposed by the government). A
modern test did not yield a definitive result in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94
S. Ct. 1704 (1974). However, many commentators see Justice Douglas'
dissent as predictive.
For a discussion of the constitutionality of affirmative action plans, see
Getman, The Emerging Principles of Sexual Equality, 1972 SuP. CT. REV.
157, 166-73 (1972) ; Developments, supra note 52, at 1279-80.
34 9A common misunderstanding is that "sex" means "woman" and "race"
means "Black." It is true that affirmative action policies are a response to
particular problems, primarily underutilization of women and minorities
in the work force. However, discrimination against a man because of his sex
or against a caucasian because of race is illegal. There seems little likelihood
that employers will only hire women and Blacks once one examines the
progress of equal employment during the last ten years.
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administrative time, the monitoring, once established, becomes in-
stitutionalized and less time consuming. Some day the need for
this particular remedy will dissipate. However, for the moment
its benefits outweigh any anxieties.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Women are increasingly seeking executive, managerial, and
professional positions in business, industry, government, and acad-
emia as well as almost any other area imaginable. Traditionally,
they have been explicitly denied these positions on the basis of
their sex and the commonly-held stereotyped notions about their
sex. In the past decade, explicit sex discrimination in employment
has faded because of an adverse legal environment, a revitalized
women's movement, and a recognized need to identify the highest
qualified prospective employees. However, in many instances sex
discrimination continues, changing only from overt to covert tac-
tics. Moreover, the bases of this discrimination, stereotyped no-
tions and attitudes, remain in the minds of many employers.
The authors submit that employment in the ICJS is not un-
like employment in other fields. Although express requirements
for executive, managerial, and professional ICJS positions do not
refer to the sex of candidates, the educational, physical, health,
work experience, testing, and general reputation requirements
can covertly discriminate against women candidates. Further, it
is suspected that criminal justice systems are bastions of classic
male chauvinism which operate in a variety of unspoken ways to
effectively exclude women executives, managers, and professionals.
It is most strongly recommended that all ICJS agencies de-
velop and implement affirmative action programs, so clearly
needed by the society it serves and so clearly commanded by the
legal environment in which it operates. As a legal system, it is
most prudent for the ICJS to comply with the law. As a system
operated by people with financial support from the general pub-
lic, the ICJS has an undeniable need for the best people available
to fill its positions of responsibility and trust. Moreover, since
the ICJS asks the society it serves to have respect for law and
agents of the law, the ICJS should serve as a model of legal pro-
priety. Affirmative action programs, coupled with candid, honest
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Notes to Appendix
(a) There are 92 counties, 114 cities, and 450 towns in Indiana.
(b) Most of the information in the chart is taken from the 10OR report
filed by each county, city, and town available from the State Board of Ac-
counts, 912 State Office Building, Indianapolis, Indiana. Since these reports
WIMCM
INDIANA LAW REVIEW
contain at the best, first and last names of employees and since Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity forms which compile statistics according to sex are not
public, the numbers of women indicated are the ones positively identified.
There may be others but the percentage of women would not change sub-
stantially. The figures indicate total employees within each category and
the indication of women (W) shows how many of the total are women.
Other information is from the Roster of state and local officials of the
State of Indiana from the State Board of Accounts. Still other information,
particularly concerning towns, is from the files of the Indiana Association
of Cities and Towns. This latter information is provided on a voluntary basis
by cities and towns.
(c) Number of attorneys is derived from the Indiana Supreme Court
Disciplinary List, October 1972-73. Since there is no record of the type of
practice in which attorneys are engaged, these figures represent total num-
bers of attorneys registered according to county and indicate the total number
of women in each total. Again, this designation according to sex was derived
from given names.
(d) By statute, county sheriffs manage county jails and thus function
in a "corrections" capacity.
(e) X indicates no information was available.
(f) The first number is total population; the second is total female popu-
lation for the political unit. Figures from the 1970 census.
(g) No attempt was made to distinguish full-time and part-time em-
ployees unless the 100R report stated specifically part-time.
(h) * indicates sex was indeterminable, usually because the report con-
tained only the initials of the employees.
(j) E.E.A. employees are employed through emergency employment funds
available from the federal government and are indicated as such when so re-
ported on 100R. Use of such funds to increase the number of women employees
is notable since the federal money is not permanently available.
[Vol. 8:297
